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THE CONCEPTUAL CONUNDRUM
AT THE CORE OF THE KELO
DISSENT
MARK KELMAN*
ABSTRACT
The “strict” public use requirement, articulated by Justice Thomas in
his canonical Kelo dissent and adopted by a number of states in the wake
of the decision, would bar any taking unless the condemned property
would be owned, post-condemnation, by a governmental entity or a
common carrier and “employed” directly by the public. Though
purporting to establish a bright line rule, the test is highly indeterminate.
Among other problems, it is impossible to determine what public
“ownership” means, particularly when private parties may be bound
(contractually or in fact) to use state-seized property in particular ways;
equally impossible to determine when property is truly employed by the
public, given that some members of the public will benefit from
nominally “public” property and others will not, because they lack either
the interest or capacity to use the property.
More bothersome than the test’s indeterminacy is that it is grounded
in a profound misunderstanding of the functional nature of takings.
Condemnations (alongside conventional monetary taxes and
regulations) are simply ways of mustering resources the state controls
(directly, by taxing-and-spending or condemning-and-using or
indirectly, by regulating-and-directing). Constitutional takings law
distinguishes compensable from non-compensable governmental
actions to ensure that this power to garner resources is exercised so that
no one is singled out to contribute an unfair share to government
projects. “Public use” doctrine, on the other hand, at core regulates the

Copyright © 2021 Mark Kelman.
* James C. Gaither Professor of Law & Vice Dean, Stanford Law School.
mkelman@stanford.edu. The author would like to thank Greg Ablavsky, Michelle Wilde
Anderson, and Buzz Thompson for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Errors, of course,
remain mine.

KELMAN_03_15_21 (DO NOT DELETE)

122

3/17/2021 6:48 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 16

functional “spending” power. It attempts to limit the ways in which the
resources garnered through condemnation, a quasi-tax, are expended,
regulating whether these resources are used on adequately public, rather
than inappropriately parochial, projects.
For a host of compelling reasons, courts do not scrutinize
conventional spending or regulatory programs to guarantee that they are
adequately “public.” Supporters of the strict view of the public use
requirement offer no persuasive functional reasons to hold
condemnations to a higher standard of public use than traditional
taxation or regulation. When resources are garnered through eminent
domain, the conceptually muddy problem of unwarranted parochialism
is not clearly resolved or even functionally addressed by a strict public
use doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
Few Supreme Court cases decided this millennium stirred as much
passion as Kelo v. City of New London.1 The Court’s 5-4 decision,
consistent with prevailing precedent at the time,2 permitted the city of
New London to use its eminent domain power to transfer homes from
their owners to other private entities as part of an ultimately
unsuccessful urban redevelopment plan. For our purposes, a simplified
version of the conflict will do: Susette Kelo, a sympathetic homeowner
in the path of the redevelopment plan, was forced out of her home in
exchange for market value compensation3 so that Pfizer, a multinational private pharmaceutical company, could build a research
facility on the land seized from her and her neighbors. Proponents of
the redevelopment plan hoped that it would create jobs and bolster the
tax revenue of a city in steep economic decline.4
The case may have gone the City’s way, but those who levied a fullbore political attack in the decision’s wake on using the eminent
domain power in these sorts of economic redevelopment
condemnation cases ultimately prevailed—both in the culture war and
in the long-term political war. Justice Thomas and Justice O’Connor
each wrote dissents at the Supreme Court level. But the Thomas
dissent, which argued that that the eminent domain power could be
exercised only when seized property would be used by the public (held
by a state entity or a common carrier) after condemnation,5 triggered
1. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
2. In the two leading twentieth century cases, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), and
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), the Court had held that property was
taken “for public use” so long as the state entity had a public purpose in taking the property. See
Berman, 348 U.S. at 28 (holding that property may be taken for public use based on identification
of “blighted areas” under conditions “injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare”
of the District of Columbia); See Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. 229, 233, 241–42 (1984) (permitting
Hawaii’s use of eminent domain to redistribute land in response to market factors that
concentrated ownership).
3. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475–76. Market value compensation almost surely did not fully
indemnify her, in the sense that she was plainly not indifferent between condemnation with
compensation and no condemnation.
4. Id. at 474–75. In the end, Kelo’s land was not transferred to Pfizer or used for any other
research and development office space for that matter; her property was simply never developed
at all. See Alec Torres, Nine Years after Kelo, the Seized Land is Empty, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 5,
2014), https://nationalreview.com/2014/02/nine-years-after-kelo-seized-land-empty-alec-torres/
(“After homeowners were forced off their property for the sake of ‘economic development,’ the
city’s original development deal fell apart, and the urban-renewal corporation that ordered the
destruction has not found a developer to use the land.”).
5. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 508 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The most natural reading of the
[Takings] Clause is that it allows the government to take property only if the government owns,
or the public has a legal right to use, the property, as opposed to taking it for any public purpose
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both political mobilization against the majority decision and,
ultimately, widespread legislative reform at the state level.
In terms of the partisan culture war, Kelo united the property rightsprotective Right with nascent Occupy Wall Street anti-corporate Left
populists. These groups rallied against centrist technocratic city
planners, just as disdain for city planning had long united pro-market
folks with communitarian Leftists who objected to planned cities on
aesthetic, environmentalist, and egalitarian grounds.6 More
significantly, Kelo sparked a wave of state judicial, constitutional, and
legislative reforms, which attempted, in various ways, to reduce the use
of eminent domain to transfer property to businesses7 who, it was
alleged, would revitalize weak local economies only if the state
assembled parcels for their use.
If Thomas’s culture war triumph in Kelo foreshadowed the
hollowing of the political Center in the face of attacks from both the
populist Right and Left, that recognition alone justifies studying
Thomas’s dissent with an engaged and critical eye. But this article does
not explore all of the symbolic and political meanings afoot. Instead,
the goal of this article is to explain why the Thomas dissent, which
rejects the majority’s “public benefit” requirement and extols a “strict”
or necessity whatsoever.”).
6. See, e.g., JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 13 (1961)
(“The pseudoscience of city planning and its companion, the art of city design, have not yet
broken with the specious comfort of wishes, familiar superstitions, oversimplifications, and
symbols, and have not yet embarked upon the adventure of probing the real world.”).
7. See Marc Mihaly & Turner Smith, Kelo’s Trail: A Survey of State and Federal Legislative
and Judicial Activity Five Years Later, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 703 (2011) (summarizing state-level antiKelo reforms and detailing notable examples). Some of the state reforms echoed the O’Connor
dissent, which would permit condemnation where the condemnation itself met a broad public
need, most particularly where the seized property was blighted, akin to a public nuisance. See
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 497–98 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining that, separate from the “public
ownership” and “use-by-the-public” categories of permissible takings, “in certain
circumstances . . . takings that serve a public purpose also satisfy the Constitution even if the
property is destined for subsequent private use”). See, e.g., Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v.
Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 460 (N.J. 2007) (adjudicating a claim under New Jersey law
that allowed takings of “blighted areas”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 6A.22 (West 2018) (defining
certain “acquisition[s] of property for redevelopment purposes and to eliminate slum or blighted
conditions” as proper exercises of eminent domain). Other reforms enacted Justice Thomas’s
view by restricting eminent domain to cases in which the public would own or have access to the
property after condemnation. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2) (West 2017) (defining
“public use” to generally exclude private uses and the “indirect public benefits resulting from
private economic development and private commercial enterprise”). Still others directly banned
the use of the condemnation power to transfer property to a private owner for the purpose of
economic development. See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 1, § 816 (2020) (generally prohibiting exercises of
eminent domain to enhance tax revenue, promote commercial development, or transfer to
individuals or for-profit businesses).
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public use requirement, remains so unsatisfying as legal doctrine or as
the basis of the public policy judgments embodied in post-Kelo state
legislation.
This article will briefly review the Thomas dissent itself, but largely
ignores the strengths and weaknesses of its specific arguments. Rather,
this article observes and explores the implications of the opinion’s
deepest conceptual blind spot. What the dissent fails to recognize is that
condemnations are, at core, exercises of the functional power to tax.
They are merely one means through which the state can garner
resources. And the use of condemned property, whether dubbed
“public” or “private,” like the use of money gathered through
conventional taxation, is just one method of employing or spending
these resources to meet the ends the state seeks to meet. Absent a good
reason to differentiate the cases, we should police the use of
condemned property in the same minimal way that we police the use
of funds gathered through conventional taxation.
From the vantage point of functionalists (those who care far less
about the ways in which we formally label legal actions than about how
an action or rule affects social and economic life), takings law is about
policing taxation. The taxing power is functionally the power to garner
individual inhabitants’ resources to meet state ends. Traditional
exercises of the eminent domain power are just one method state
entities use to gather resources used in public projects and should, like
other exercise of the taxing power, be exercised so that the tax burden
is borne equitably—no inhabitants should be singled out to contribute
an unfair share of resources to government projects.
Take a simple case: When the state builds a road, it needs labor,
concrete, and land. Taxpayers usually fund the cost of labor and
purchase of concrete through taxes, and the relative impact on those
who pay such taxes is regulated, if at all, outside the domain of takings
law.8 On the other hand, taxpayers pay for the land only if the state
either purchases it through voluntary exchange or if the state employs
the eminent domain power (compelling a landowner to turn over her
property) and has to compensate her for the value of the property
taken. If, instead, land is seized without compensation, then some
8. See MARK KELMAN, WHAT Is IN A NAME? 125–26, 177–92 (2019) (discussing existing
doctrinal limitations on Equal Protection clause-based constitutional restrictions on the
maldistribution of tax burdens, and urging that the courts should be more aggressive in
scrutinizing tax schemes under the Equal Protection clause to guard against unfair distribution of
tax burdens).
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landowners would bear a quasi-tax that similarly situated fellow
inhabitants do not pay. This quasi-tax is imposed simply because the
condemnees happened to own land in the path of proposed
development; however, the Fifth Amendment’s compensation
requirement guards against the imposition of that unfair burden.9
But the state can also use regulations as a means of gathering
resources for government projects: Governments may choose to pursue
public goals by imposing a regulatory quasi-tax or by funding programs
with tax dollars. For example, a local building code may require that
buildings be constructed with costly fire-retardant materials or
sprinklers. Such fire safety requirements garner resources initially from
builders, although the costs are likely ultimately borne largely by
buyers of housing services and commercial space. These safety
expenditures decrease the risk of massive conflagration, just as taxes
could fund more extensive public firefighting agencies to meet the
same goal. Similarly, a regulation forbidding building in a flood plain
forces an owner to sacrifice resources to diminish flood damage, just as
a tax-and-spend based program to build a better levee would. A rent
control program effectively transfers resources from landlords,
forbidden to charge market rate rents to tenants, just as a housing
voucher program would transfer resources from taxpayers to tenants.
Judicial decisions requiring compensation in “regulatory takings” cases
protect against the unfair distribution of regulatory compliance
burdens.
From the vantage of those interested in function rather than form
or label, “public use” doctrine regulates not the taxing power but the
spending power. It attempts to limit the ways in which the resources
garnered through these functional “quasi-taxes” are expended. It
regulates whether these resources are utilized on an adequately public,
rather than an inappropriately parochial, project. Even focusing
narrowly on real property, the question of whether the state entity is
making a public use of land does not depend on its manner of
acquisition. The public use determination is independent of whether
the state entity acquired the land through condemnation or a voluntary
transaction.
Efforts to integrate these two policy concerns—guaranteeing fair
distribution of tax burdens and limiting parochial uses of publicly

9. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4 (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”).
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controlled resources—are far more difficult than Justice Thomas seems
to recognize. Broadly speaking, this is the Thomas dissent’s fatal flaw.
Justice Thomas fails to adequately explain why a state’s spending
power must be tied to, and thus limited by, the source of the expended
resources. Functionalists have no reason to care more about how
resources acquired through condemnation than through direct taxation
or regulatory quasi-taxes are used.10 Absent such an explanation, tying
these issues together is wholly unreasonable.11 Moreover, it is nearly
impossible to determine whether any collective spending program is
truly “public,” should we conclude that we are constitutionally obliged
to make that determination. Put simply, the benefits from collectively
funded programs are never evenly distributed. This will be true even
when the state uses resources (including condemned real property) to
provide the quintessentially publicly owned goods Justice Thomas
believes that the state is permitted to furnish using the property that it
has taken.
Part I briefly addresses the textual and historical arguments that
Justice Thomas relied on in his dissent. Then, it critically examines his
functional, policy-based argument that a strict public use requirement
is a significant bulwark that protects disempowered (often Black)
homeowners from displacement at the behest of the politically
powerful. Part II addresses the ambiguities and shortcomings in the
dissent. For example, Justice Thomas fails to address the following: To
what degree is a use adequately public when citizens vary in their
ability to access and benefit from property nominally open to the
public? What should we do when property seized by the state is then
privatized, and how much public control over the private holder of the
property is sufficient to meet the Thomas test? Does Justice Thomas

10. Source and use can be legitimately connected in some circumstances. For instance, it
seems appropriate that those subject to benefits taxes (e.g. taxes levied on landowners to account
for the costs of providing them with infrastructure) can insist that the benefits taxes are indeed
used to pay for the infrastructure. The question I raise in this Article is whether there is any
similar, plausible link between the tax form here (a taking of property) and the use (a particular
sort of public use.) In Part III.B, I explore (and reject) some arguments that the type or level of
the injury to a property owner whose property is condemned does depend on the use to which the
property is put.
11. It also raises justiciability concerns: the problem is that condemnees in cases like Kelo
are arguably not making a justiciable claim because the injury they experience from the Taking is
in no way affected by the subsequent use of the property. See David L. Breau, Note, A New Take
on Public Use: Were Kelo and Lingle Nonjusticiable?, 55 DUKE L.J. 835, 837 (2006) (“In Kelo and
Lingle, the Court could plausibly have questioned the plaintiffs’ standing to enjoin a violation of
the Public Use Clause, because that violation would not exist but for the injury suffered by other
citizens qua citizens, who were unable to seek judicial relief.”).
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intend that his public use test ought to function as a ban on state action
in many regulatory takings cases where, to this point, we have simply
required compensation to an affected owner when the value of her
property is diminished by the regulation? Finally, Part III addresses,
and rejects, four arguments that courts should scrutinize the use of
condemned property more than they review the use of tax funds.
I. THE THOMAS DISSENT
The Kelo majority, consistent with prior Supreme Court case law,
held that a transfer of the condemnee’s property to a private entity was
for a “public use” so long as it served a “public purpose,” and more
particularly for the specific redevelopment taking in Kelo, that the
condemnation and transfer were part of a development plan calculated
to further public interests.12 The Thomas dissent urges instead that
condemnations ought to be forbidden unless, after condemnation, the
seized property is held by a state entity or a common carrier obliged to
serve all members of the public. His dissent in Kelo relies on textual
interpretation (i.e., how the words used in the constitutional text were
understood by the text’s readers at the time of constitutional
ratification), an argument grounded in historical practice, and a policy
argument.
A. Textual Argument
The textual argument is that the public use requirement in the Fifth
Amendment13 should be read narrowly: Condemned property is not
put to public use simply if it is used in a way that benefits the public,
but rather that the “public” (defined as either the government or, more

12. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484–85 (2005) (concluding that the
interest in developing the land at issue did not have “less of a public character” than the interests
behind takings that the Court had upheld in previous cases).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”). Some commentators have argued that the amendment was not intended to
restrict the use of what was presumed to be a capacious sovereign power to take property, but
merely to require compensation when the power was exercised. See Matthew P. Harrington,
“Public Use” and the Original Understanding of the So-Called “Takings” Clause, 3 HASTINGS L.J.
1245, 1249 (2002) (“[T]he term “public use” as used in the Fifth Amendment was meant to be
descriptive, rather than proscriptive, and . . . [it] was not intended to operate as a substantive
limitation on Congress’s power to expropriate property.”); Timothy J. Dowling, How to Think
about Kelo after the Shouting Stops, 36 URB. LAW. 191, 194 (2006) (“Early constitutional
commentators observed that the most striking feature of the public use language is the failure of
the text to couch the reference as an affirmative restriction on eminent domain.”). But see Kelo,
545 U.S. at 507 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the public use language would be
uninterpretable surplusage unless meant to limit governmental power).
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ambiguously, “citizens as a whole”) must actually “employ” the taken
property.14 Thus, the taking is permissible only if, post-condemnation,
the government (or a private entity with common carrier obligations)
owns the seized property.15 There is a good deal of academic debate
over both the range of meanings the word “use” had during the
Founding era and over Justice Thomas’s claim that the narrow meaning
is most sensible in this context.16
B. Historical Practice Argument
The historical practice argument is partly based on the idea that the
states’ early eminent domain practice “liquidates” the original text of
the Fifth Amendment, permitting us to see more clearly how the
ratifying public likely read the constitutional text, particularly when
state constitutions employed the same language.17 In this regard, Justice
Thomas claims that states used the eminent domain power almost
exclusively for “quintessentially public goods” (like roads, canals,
railroads and parks) or when granting land rights to common carriers
(private entities that were legally bound to serve all members of the
public).18 Leave aside, for now, one of the difficult conceptual questions
14. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 508 (“When the government takes property and gives it to a private
individual, and the public has no right to use the property, it strains language to say that the public
is ‘employing’ the property, regardless of the incidental benefits that might accrue to the public
from the private use.”).
15. See id. at 510 (“The Constitution’s text, in short, suggests that the Takings Clause
authorizes the taking of property only if the public has a right to employ it, not if the public
realizes any conceivable benefit from the taking.”).
16. See, e.g., Emily A. Johnson, Reconciling Originalism and the History of the Public Use
Clause, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 265, 286–87 (2010) (noting that originalists employ the eighteenth
century definition of “use” to argue for both broad and strict interpretations of the Takings
Clause); David L. Breau, Justice Thomas’ Kelo Dissent, or, “History as a Grab Bag of Principles,”
38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 373, 376 (2007) (arguing that the language of the Takings Clause does
not clearly provide that the public must use the property); Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Eminent
Domain, “Public Use,” and the Conundrum of Original Intent, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 59, 85
(1996) (making an original “public meaning” argument that the Framers intended the words
“public use” to mean “public benefit”); see also Dowling, supra note 13, at 194–95 (asserting that
broad meanings of public use reflected common parlance and were prevalent in major legal
commentaries on which the Framers relied).
As I note once again in Part III, below, I have little to add either to the general debate over the
propriety of originalism as a guide to constitutional adjudication or to the particular debates in
the public use context over either the meaning of the text or the contours of historical practice.
This Article is focused on a functional, policy-driven interpretation of the public use requirement.
For constitutional originalists, one should think of my audience as state legislators considering
adopting the Thomas dissent as statutory law or constitutional amendment.
17. See William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 62 (2019) (clarifying
that although Founding Era practice is “not given privileged place by the theory of liquidation,”
their decisions should get some extra consideration as elucidating ambiguous original meaning).
18. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 511–14 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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confronted later in the Article: In what sense is any road (or other
“public” facility for that matter) truly a public facility in the sense that
its benefits are distributed in anything resembling a pro rata fashion to
members of the community? There is still considerable debate about
whether the late nineteenth-century practices that most plainly violate
Justice Thomas’s precepts19 should count as either evidence of the
initial understanding of the constitutional language or give guidance to
those who believe historical practice is relevant to understanding our
constitutional traditions. Questions also remain about whether Justice
Thomas has interpreted the earlier nineteenth century evidence
properly.20
C. “Policy” – Protecting the Powerless from Displacement? Of
property rights protection, public choice, and anti-subordination
At the very end of his dissent, Justice Thomas adopts a more
functionalist interpretive approach—focusing primarily on the
consequences of alternative interpretations of “public use” under the
Fifth Amendment.21 His functionalist argument is that a narrow view
of the public use requirement is essential, lest powerful private parties
expropriate the property (particularly, the homes) of the powerless. His
account of power disparities appeals first to public choice theorists
often associated with the political Right. Under the public choice
theory, well-organized rent-seeking constituencies, seeking a highly
19. See, e.g., Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906)
(permitting the condemnation of property to be used by a mining company to run an aerial oretransporting bucket line over the condemnee’s property, but noting “the inadequacy of use by the
general public as a universal test”); Johnson, supra note 16, at 319 (arguing that the Kelo majority
best captures the appropriate historical understanding of “public use” when it remits decisions
about limitations on the condemnation power to the states.); Jonathan Lahn, The Uses of History
in the Supreme Court’s Takings Clause Jurisprudence, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1233, 1247–58 (2006)
(challenging Thomas’s uses of history by summarizing evidence from Colonial government
practice and Mill Acts, which permitted owners of private mills to destroy private property held
by other private owners).
20. To the extent that early state practice is not just a guide to textual interpretation but an
expositor of “American tradition,” it is hard to argue that the Court should be especially strict in
protecting owners against condemnations. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860 at 64–65 (1977) (noting that only a small handful of state
constitutions addressed the takings issue at all at the time of the Framing, and that most states
often seized property without any compensation well into the nineteenth century).
21. I strongly suspect that these policy arguments are not the arguments that mattered most
to Justice Thomas himself. Instead, I believe that he relied most on the textualist arguments. Since
this essay is more policy-focused, in significant part because it is concerned with state legislation
that is consonant with the Kelo dissent’s ideals, I focus more on this aspect of the decision.
Moreover, as I said, I have nothing interesting to add to the textual and historical debates that I
noted in notes 16 and 19.
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concentrated benefit, will exploit those less able to organize—typically
because of vulnerability to free rider problems that diffuse citizens with
similar interests face in organizing. But the argument’s emphasis on
protecting the vulnerable also appeals to anti-subordination theorists
usually associated with the political Left. Working class and poor folk,
and even more pointedly, people of color, will get trampled upon by the
elite when they happen to own land the elite desires. Justice Thomas
throws in a dash of anti-technocratic, anti-economic efficiency language
that appeals to libertarians and Leftists alike: The specter of forced
transfer of land from any low-valued to any higher-valued use (just to
increase tax hauls) looms large.22
D. Alternative mechanisms of displacement: public uses and private
forces
Whatever one makes of the history of “urban renewal” or
“economic development” planning,23 the connection between
narrowing the public use doctrine and protectiveness of the displaced
is, at best, imperfect.24 While excoriating the majority for perpetuating
racial bias, Thomas notes that Black communities in St. Paul, Minnesota
22. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 521–22 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[The losses from the broad public
purpose test] will fall disproportionately on poor communities. Those communities are not only
systematically less likely to put their lands to the highest and best social use, but are also the least
politically powerful. . .The deferential standard this Court has adopted for the Public Use Clause
encourages ‘those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process,
including large corporations and development firms’ to victimize the weak . . . . Of all the families
displaced by urban renewal from 1949 to 1963, 63 percent of those whose race was known were
nonwhite, and of these families, 56 percent of nonwhites and 38 percent of white had incomes low
enough to qualify for public housing . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
23. For a relatively negative view of urban renewal projects that nonetheless adverts to a
number of more successful projects as well, see generally Amy Levine, Urban Renewal and the
Story of Berman v. Parker, 42 THE URBAN LAWYER 423 (2010). Levine is plainly wary of the
deference courts showed to these plans. Id. at 425 (“The governmental goals of blight removal
and redevelopment were not inherently bad. . . . But the Supreme Court’s extreme deference
allowed urban renewal projects to go forward across the country with an astonishing lack of
attention to the welfare of the people that the programs were supposed to benefit.”). Far and
away the most sophisticated view in the legal literature of the virtues of well-executed economic
development plans—presented alongside a strongly justified claim that the sorts of development
plans and condemnation schemes the dissenters in Kelo excoriate were far more common in the
middle of the twentieth century than they were by the turn of the millennium when the case was
decided – can be found in Marc B. Mihaly, Living in the Past: The Kelo Court and Public-Private
Economic Redevelopment, 59 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2007). Mihaly points, for instance, to two quite
beneficial redevelopment projects in San Francisco in which private owners received some
condemned land (the Ferry Building project and the Gap Headquarters project) that could not
have succeeded absent the use of eminent domain, given holdout problems. Id. at 28–32.
24. See, e.g., Julia D. Mahoney, Kelo’s Legacy: Eminent Domain and the Future of Property
Rights, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 124 (2005) (“Thomas does not explain whether or how his favored
interpretation would protect those imperiled by eminent domain.”).
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and Baltimore, Maryland were wiped out by the use of eminent
domain.25 However, he fails to explain how that history is relevant to
his dissent because these communities were destroyed not by economic
development plans but by public works projects that, ironically, are
plainly acceptable under the Thomas test. More generally, the interstate
highway program, though creating manifestly “public uses” in
Thomas’s sense, frequently displaced poor Black families and
destroyed Black communities;26 this racist legacy of the highway
programs was often highlighted by Anthony Foxx, President Obama’s
last Transportation Secretary.27
Meanwhile, and of enormous moment, Thomas shows little concern
for homeowner displacement and the destruction of neighborhoods
that occur through the operation of unfettered market forces,28
including gentrification.29 Consider the poster child case for opponents

25. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
26. See Caitlin Dewey, Advocates Rally to Tear Down Highways that Bulldozed Black
Neighborhoods, PEW STATELINE (July 28, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2020/07/28/advocates-rally-to-tear-down-highways-that-bulldozed-blackneighborhoods; Scott Beyer, How the US Government Destroyed Black Neighborhoods,
CATALYST (April 2, 2020), catalyust.independent.org/2020/04/02/how-the-u-s-governmentdestroyed-black-neighborhoods; Alena Samuels, The Role of Highways in American Poverty,
THE ATLANTIC (March 18, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/03/role-ofhighways-in-american-poverty/474282/.
27. See, e.g., Sarafina Wright, Highways ruined Black communities, says Transportation
chief, THE LA. WEEKLY (Apr. 11, 2016), www.louisianaweekly.com/highways-ruined-blackcommunities-says-transportation-chief/ (“In place after place, highways cut the heart out of lowincome and minority communities.”).
28. See Matthew Desmond & Tracey Shollenberger, Forced Displacement from Rental
Housing: Prevalence and Neighborhood Consequences, 52 DEMOGRAPHY 1751, 1760–61 (2015)
(analyzing a survey of Milwaukee renters finding that one in eight had lost his or her home
“involuntarily” within the past two years – through formal or informal eviction, property
condemnation for non-payment of taxes or blight – and noting further that involuntarily-displaced
renters often moved to worse neighborhoods, and that outcomes were worse for Black and Latinx
renters than for white renters). In Mihaly’s account of successful private-public redevelopment
plans in San Francisco, he notes that had the City simply allowed market forces to go unfettered,
landlords in the Yerba Buena area adjacent to the downtown commercial district would simply
have sold to office developers, displacing thousands of tenants, while the Yerba Buena mixed
private-public redevelopment plan not only created lots of traditionally valued public facilities
(e.g. parks, playgrounds, two museums) but also displaced fewer lower income tenants than would
likely have been displaced through unconstrained market forces: 1400 of the 2500 units of new
housing built in the project were reserved for low-income tenants. Mihaly, supra note 23, at 20.
29. See generally Miriam Zuk et al., Gentrification, Displacement, and the Role of Public
Investment, 33 J. PLANNING LIT. 31 (2018) (summarizing the debates over the meaning of
gentrification and the meaning of displacement and looking at distinct empirical measures of the
impact of “gentrification” on incumbents). The quick response by those unbothered by this aspect
of Thomas’s opinion might be that gentrification occurs only through voluntary sale so that no
one “loses” but, instead, merely voluntarily exchanges her home for the proffered offering price.
But renters can lose long-occupied homes without compensation, and homeowners may not
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of economic development takings that preceded the New London
redevelopment plan litigated in Kelo: Detroit’s condemnation of
private homes and businesses in Poletown.30 The land was condemned
and refurbished at a total cost to the city of more than $200 million and
then sold for a mere $8 million to General Motors, which built an auto
plant on the assembled parcel.31 The land was not only condemned for
GM’s benefit, it was effectively given to GM, alongside tax abatements.
Furthermore, the City did not bind GM by contract to provide any
particular number of jobs or to ensure that jobs were held by particular
classes of people. Other aspects of this condemnation are discussed
below. But for now, the critical issue is the blind hypocrisy of those who
claim to “protect” communities from eminent domain while ignoring
the market and non-governmental forces that are at least as disruptive.
Those who decry the horrific impact of eminent domain typically
idealize the Poletown community and emphasize the disruption that
the takings caused while ignoring disruptions caused by other forces
that had already occurred. Here’s an entirely typical sentimental
statement from the era: “The neighborhood selected for the new plant,
however, was a rare commodity in an urban environment: a stable,
integrated area that in many ways harkened back to the close-knit
ethnic communities that characterized Detroit’s past.”32 True, many
individuals living in Poletown’s Central Industrial Park (CIP)

adequately account for the negative externalities they generate when they sell (nor are they able
to capture positive externalities from preserving a historic neighborhood absent coordination).
Moreover, while most homeowners whose property is condemned may well be
undercompensated, they do not simply suffer uncompensated “losses.”
30. See generally JEANIE WYLIE, POLETOWN: COMMUNITY BETRAYED (1990) (chronicling
the “horror” of the destruction of the neighborhood as a central theme).
31. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 469 (Mich. 1981)
(Ryan, J., dissenting).
32. David R.E. Aludjeh, Public Use and Treatment as an Equal: An Essay on Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 15 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 671, 673–74 (1988). Here are some other examples of the over-sentimentalized blindness to
Poletown’s pre-condemnation collapse: “Before GM, Poletown was a thriving neighborhood”
and “a vibrant ethnic neighborhood . . . .” Aaron Foley, In retrospect, GM’s Poletown plant was a
NEIGHBORHOODS,
petty
terrible
idea
if
we’re
being
honest,
THE
https://theneighborhoods.org/story/retrospect-gms-poletown-plant-was-pretty-terrible-idea-ifwere-being-honest (last visited Jan. 25, 2021). “[Poletown’s] residents were working class people
who had jobs in nearby factories and quietly went about the business of pursuing the American
dream. . . . Poletown was a living, breathing neighborhood that more than 3,000 people called
home.” Carla T. Main, How Eminent Domain Ran Amok, REAL CLEAR POLS. (Oct. 22, 2005),
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/Commentary/com-10_21_05_CTM.html. Poletown is “one of
many viable lower-class urban neighborhoods destroyed . . . by city governments’ use of eminent
domain.” Derek Shearer, Poletown: Community Destroyed, MULTINAT’L MONITOR (Feb. 1991),
https://www.multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1990/01/shearer.html.
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neighborhood targeted for redevelopment were profoundly upset to be
displaced by the condemnations, and many people thought highly of
the neighborhood. But far more people exited the neighborhood due
to extra-governmental forces than were displaced by the condemnation
and redevelopment plan: Between 1970 and 1980, the population in the
CIP had declined by about two-thirds, from 15,188 to 5,885.33 More than
9,000 people had already been “displaced”—compared to the 4,200
who lost their homes to make way for the GM plant.34 And unlike the
“victims” of eminent domain, many of those who left in the 1970s left
without any compensation because the homes in the neighborhood
often were not sellable. Indeed, a full one-third of the homes in this
sentimentalized area were abandoned at the time of the GM-related
condemnations.35
Again, there is no doubt that many CIP residents were deeply upset
to see their neighborhood razed. For example, the Poletown
Neighborhood Council not only sued but also organized significant
protests, and many (though by no means all) of the protesters were
community residents. But the evidence on the whole strongly suggests
that a majority of the residents were happy to get out of a dilapidated
neighborhood,36 and that most remaining residents had not left yet
because they lacked the resources to do so without the condemnation
awards. First, 90 percent of the homeowners in the CIP voluntarily
accepted the City’s offers to purchase their homes (and get relocation
bonuses and assistance).37 Of course, those voluntary acceptances alone
are not conclusive evidence of community residents’ preferences, given
that their homes would ultimately be condemned if they did not sell
prior to condemnation.38 But of the 160 who refused, only ninety-five

33. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/RCED-90-48FS, INFORMATION ON
RESIDENT AND BUSINESS RELOCATION FROM POLETOWN PROJECT 2, 10 (1989).
34. Id. Rates of population decline in the CIP were even higher than they were in Poletown
generally; the CIP lost 61% of its population in the decade, compared to 37% in the Poletown
area more generally. Id.
35. Id. at 13.
36. See id. at 36 (“The two surveys of relocated residents indicated that a majority of those
residents believed the move was beneficial. They liked their new homes and believed the city had
treated them fairly.”).
37. Id. at 16.
38. See David A. Dana, Reframing Eminent Domain: Unsupported Advocacy, Ambiguous
Economics, and the Case for a New Public Use Test, 32 VT. L. REV. 129, 135–36 (2007) (“In cases
of land assembly in the shadow of a plausible threat that eminent domain will be employed by
government officials to facilitate land assembly for development purposes, it is reasonable to
assume that—indeed, developers confirm as much—land acquisition negotiations are affected
and facilitated by that threat.”).
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sued to stop the condemnation, and sixty-five simply sued to be
compensated more.39 Second, and far more significantly, the survey
data strongly supports the conclusion that for the vast majority, leaving
(and the opportunity to leave afforded by the condemnation and
relocation assistance awards) was a boon, not a trauma. A full 85
percent of CIP residents over sixty years-old thought the
condemnation-induced move had proven positive, as did 62 percent of
those between eighteen and fifty-nine.40 One of the obvious reasons for
their satisfaction is that this purportedly joyous “rare” and “stable”
throwback community was nothing of the sort. Indeed, more than 60
percent of respondents felt, at the time of the condemnations, that
crime was a serious problem.41 Nearly the same percentage of people
identified abandonment, dilapidated buildings, roaming dogs, and
inadequate maintenance as serious problems plaguing Poletown.42 The
ability to move to areas where fewer than 10 percent of respondents
thought that crime was a serious problem was a welcome
development.43
Unfortunately, there is no study of the Fort Trumbull neighborhood
of New London similar to the GAO Poletown study, so it is hard to say
how residents of the felt about the condemnations at issue in Kelo. The
Poletown data, though, should make legislators considering restrictions
on eminent domain wary of claims that condemnation, rather than
economic decline, is the most significant driver of displacement. Thus,
policy makers should be vigilant and recognize when residents on the
whole, rather than a sub-set of resisters, would welcome a
condemnation award and a concomitant opportunity to exit a declining
area.
II. AMBIGUITIES AND SHORTCOMINGS IN THE DISSENT
While Justice Thomas might well believe that his test establishes a
fairly bright-line rule to distinguish permissible from impermissible
uses of the condemnation power, his rule permitting the government to
take property only when the public will employ or have access to the
condemned property or when the government or common carrier
“owns” the property after condemnation is far more ambiguous and

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 33, at 16.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 19–20.
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indeterminate than he acknowledges. That is in part because it is
unclear what it means to say that the “public” has access to property
when access is incomplete (e.g., available only at a price that some
would or could not pay) or the benefits of access unevenly distributed.
It is unclear as well when the public can be said to “own” property if
state actors “substantially control” nominally privately owned
property. Finally, it is unclear what it might even mean for the public to
own or have access to condemned property in most cases involving
regulatory takings claims in which the owner retains some rights in
relationship to her property (like landlords forbidden to charge market
rents or landowners subject to what they see as hyper-restrictive zoning
regulations), but its use or disposition is restricted in some way that
substantially diminishes its value to the owner.
A. Incomplete public access and unevenly distributed public benefit
The Kelo majority spotted some of the facially obvious and
significant ambiguities in the Thomas dissent—problems of application
that have remained fundamentally insoluble. If condemned property
must be put to public use, what does it mean, practically speaking, for
the public to “make use” of the property? What proportion of the
public need have access to the property? At what price?44 (The “price”
question must be a stand-in-for the question, “is something truly open
to the public unless access is free?” since presumably some would-be
users would be deterred from use by any positive price).45
The common carrier cases raise both questions directly: Common
carriers may be legally obliged to serve all members of the public who
can pay to use their services, but many members of the public may have
neither realistic access to the common carrier nor an ability (or
willingness) to pay. The same is true of quintessentially public National
Parks, which can and do charge entrance fees, and which are located in
places far more accessible to some members of the public than to
others.46 Consider also the use of eminent domain to acquire land to
44. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479 (2005).
45. See id. at 479 (“Not only was the ‘use by the public’ test difficult to answer (e.g., what
proportion of the public need have access to the property? At what price?), but it proved to be
impractical given the diverse and always evolving needs of society.” (cleaned up)).
46. See, e.g., Entrance Fees and Where to Get Your Park Passes for Yosemite, MY YOSEMITE
PARK (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.myyosemitepark.com/park/entrance-fees (indicating that
Yosemite charges $35 for a vehicle to enter). One could argue that the public generally benefits
either from the existence value or option value of preserving National Park land, but even as to
existence value or option value, willingness to pay would certainly be quite heterogeneous.
Existence value, however, is a non-rivalrous, non-exclusive good.
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build either publicly owned or privately owned sports stadiums. Justice
O’Connor mentions stadiums in her Kelo dissent as plainly acceptable
public projects, presumably not only because most are nominally
publicly owned, but because, like any common carrier, they are “open
to the public”—at least the portion of the public who are willing and
able to pay a fee.47 But, of course, fees to attend professional football
games surely preclude many, if not most, members of the public from
using the facility situated on the condemned property. Those unable to
pay ticket prices are physically excluded even if (in the more diffuse
sense contemplated by the “public benefit” test) they are happy to have
a local team to root for or made better off because the team’s presence
generates economic activity.
These conventional common carrier cases pose a still-bigger
conceptual problem that the majority ignores in its critique: Some
people benefit a good deal from public projects, while others simply do
not. This problem plainly applies to the standard public infrastructure
cases (e.g., roads) that lack a critical defining feature of what
economists would think of as pure public goods: People can be
excluded from using or enjoying a road or public park so that these are
not “non-exclusive” goods in the way a pure public good is. When a
road is extended, the primary beneficiaries of the extension are
landowners, residents, and busines owners and customers in the area
that will be served by the road—even if the road is formally open to the
innumerable inhabitants of the jurisdiction who may never use it
directly48 and who benefit from its existence in precisely the same way
that they could benefit from economic redevelopment projects.49
47. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 498 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he sovereign may transfer
private property to private parties, often common carriers, who make the property available for
the public’s use—such as with a railroad, a public utility, or a stadium.”).
48. In response Justice Thomas asserts that there is public access so long as all similarly
situated members of the public have access. See id. at 515 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Thus, the
‘public’ did have the right to use the irrigation ditch because all similarly situated members of the
public – those who owned lands irrigated by the ditch – had a right to use it.”). But this is a puzzling
and unpersuasive assertion; all similarly situated members of the New London community—e.g.,
those who work at Pfizer—have access to Pfizer buildings and those who are differently situated
(not owning land near the ditch, not doing business with Pfizer) do not. It is unlikely that Justice
Thomas would find state laws permitting landlocked owners to condemn easements over a
neighbor’s property any more acceptable in situations in which multiple parties were landlocked
and all of these similarly situated landlocked parties could avail themselves of the same easement.
49. The facts of City of Omaha v. Tract No. 1, 778 N.W.2d 122 (Neb. Ct. App. 2010), decided
under a post-Kelo state reform statute, are instructive. The condemnees complained that the City
could not take land to build a decelerator lane for traffic necessitated entirely by the construction
of a store owned by a particular “well-known national retailer.” And, of course, it is the retailer
and that retailer’s customers alone who directly benefit from the decelerator lane. And the private

KELMAN_03_15_21 (DO NOT DELETE)

138

3/17/2021 6:48 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 16

But even the benefits from goods that economists would plainly
define as non-exclusive, pure public goods (like the national defense,
clean air, street lighting)50 are likewise unevenly distributed. The
nation’s missile defense systems aid those who live in areas more
vulnerable to missile attack more than those who do not. The value of
cleaner air in any location depends on distinctions in health status and
sensitivity to pollution. The value of clean air projects further depends
on the baseline vulnerability of a particular region’s air to degradation.
One might imagine arguing in the roads case that while most
members of the public make no use of a particular road, the road
system writ large is publicly used. Under Justice Thomas’s narrow view
of public use, the fact that a project is part of a system of projects likely
to be reasonably beneficial to most members of the public is
insufficient to justify the use of eminent domain.51 An argument

purpose – and doubtless the private impetus for the decelerator lane – are most transparent here
because the lane is added to an existing road system. But, of course, any road system selectively
benefits landowners adjacent to the roads (and the retailers who open up there, or the producers
who ship products more cheaply because the road system exists). The Nebraska court nonetheless
sustained the taking – finding that “as a matter of law . . . construction for traffic control and safety
purposes does not constitute an ‘economic development purpose . . . .” Id. at 125.
50. These are public goods from the vantage of mainstream economists both in the sense
that they are non-rivalrous (consumption of the good by one party does not diminish the capacity
of others to consume it) and in the sense that full-bore exclusion of some members of the public
from enjoying the good is impossible.
51. Justice Ryan, in his renowned dissent in the Poletown case, did seem to feel that
developing infrastructure of use to the public—whether actually used by all members of the public
or not—is legitimate even though plainly justified at bottom by its role in diffuse economic
development. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 645 (Mich.
1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting). He describes privately owned infrastructure that serves as what he
calls an “instrumentality of commerce” as an exception or qualification to the rule that the state
cannot meet its economic development goals through transferring condemned property to private
entities, id. at 670–71, but does not really satisfactorily explain why he thinks the exception is in
any sense principled: His efforts, id. at 674–81, are all off-point. His first argument fundamentally
echoes Professor Merrill’s argument that the public use doctrine should focus on the public
necessity of using condemnation (the means) rather than the ends to which condemned property
is put and emphasizes that the condemnation power should only be used to overcome hold-out
problems. See generally Thomas A. Merrill, Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61
(1986). Justice Ryan’s argument is that in the instrumentalities of commerce cases, collective
action is indispensable. The argument is wholly ungrounded; hold-out problems are just as likely
to be present in the Kelo situation as in the case where land is acquired for a privately owned
canal or railroad. And the second argument – that there is greater ongoing accountability in cases
in which the private owner creates an “instrumentality of commerce” – is wholly contingent; levels
of regulation of railroads and canals could be strict or minimal, contractual arrangements with
private corporations in economic development cases can also vary widely. And the final criteria
– that the land is selected without regard to the wishes of a particular developer – seems not to
distinguish the cases either: irrigation and road projects can be sought by particular interests, and
one could describe GM (or the UAW, another strong supporter of the project) in Poletown as
merely pointing out a fact about modern automobile production, not a fact about their particular
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focused on systemic or distributed benefits is neither plainly germane
nor even true. It is not germane because the relevant question for
Justice Thomas in cases like Kelo is whether the use of the condemnee’s
land in particular is adequately public. The question is not whether the
use of similar land for like projects would benefit enough people to
count as “public use.” If a distributed benefit is insufficient to render
the project in Kelo “public,” it ought to be insufficient to render the
construction of particular roads adequately public just because the
public at large would benefit if the state entity built a string of different
roads. Worse still, arguments focused on the systemic benefits of
infrastructure development are not even true in the sense that some
people make far less use of infrastructure generally than others do.
If the point of the “public use” requirement is to prevent the use of
property on unduly parochial projects, then Thomas’s test will be
useless. It is always the case that public projects help some citizens far
more than they help others. Ownership by the state or a common
carrier by no means guarantees that the benefits of a project are
enjoyed evenly or enjoyed at all by many.
B. Privatization and questions of adequate government “control”
The Thomas dissent also fails to confront whether privatized
facilities built on state-condemned land satisfy his public use or
ownership test. Start with a simple case: It is clear that a state could use
its eminent domain power to procure land for a prison or jail.52 But
what would Thomas say we should do if the state seeks to seize land for
a privatized prison, or if the state transfers control of a public facility to
a private operator?53 There are innumerable critiques of private

interests – that production occurs only in horizontal, large parcel plants. More generally, it might
well be true that infrastructure development generally is of use to members of the public
regardless of their specific uses, but it simply is not true that the extension of infrastructure
facilitated by any particular condemnation plays anything like that role.
52. See, e.g., Diana Berliner, Public Power, Private Gain, INST. FOR JUST. 1, 1 (2003) (“To
most people, the meaning of ‘public use’ is fairly obvious–things like highways, bridges, prisons,
and courts.” (emphasis added)).
53. It cannot be that those on the political Right most virulently in favor of narrowly
construing “public use” would think it appropriate to stand in the way of privatization of public
service delivery by barring a Taking simply because a private entity operated a facility
traditionally owned and managed by the state. Conservative and libertarian commentators have
strongly advocated privatization of previously state-owned or operated enterprises of various
forms, arguing particularly that the world-wide privatization wave that began with privatization
in the UK during the Conservative Thatcher regime in the 1980s has been an important source of
economic progress. See generally Chris Edwards, Margaret Thatcher’s Privatization Legacy, 37
CATO J. 89 (2017) (arguing that privatization of public service delivery under Margaret Thatcher’s
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prisons,54 but it is unfathomable that the validity of condemnation
would turn on whether the condemned property was used by the state
itself to deliver a service or whether the land was used by a private
entity that the state had entrusted with delivering that same service.55
Thomas’s test demands that the public either “uses” or “owns”
condemned property, but a private prison is not unambiguously used
by the public in the sense that all members of the public have access to
the prison land. Furthermore, trying to answer the question of whether
the public “owns” the land only reveals what a hopeless task it is to
determine when the state retains enough rights over property to dub
the state an “owner.”56
One could argue that so long as the state leases the condemned
property to the privatized operator, it remains a formal owner because
it retains a reversion interest in the property. But in many cases, the
state’s reversion interest is close to economically worthless. (e.g., cases
in which tenants have long-term leases or renewal options). State and
local governments regularly enter into such long-term lease
agreements with operators of sports stadiums. And private developers
in economic redevelopment plans often lease the land the city has
condemned.57 In some cases (like Poletown), private developers buy
fee interests in the condemned land, often at a subsidized price. In the
Poletown example, would GM have cared whether it got a fee interest
in the land seized by Detroit rather than a long-term or renewable lease
to build its plant? If private entities are often indifferent between being
dubbed tenants and being dubbed owners—they have fundamentally
the same levels of control and the same economic interests whether
they lease or own—then it would be preposterous to think that states
satisfy Thomas’s public ownership requirement merely by leasing out
the land to a private user. That the private user would be “no more”
than a “mere” tenant should be of no determinative consequence.

conservative government spurred economic growth).
54. See generally, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.
J. 437 (2005).
55. See James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859, 865
(2004) (noting that a public use test of the form that Justice Thomas articulates creates unwise
incentives to disdain privatization).
56. See Mihaly, supra note 23, at 39 (“The increasing sophistication of the public-private
relationship renders the public-private ownership distinction even more uncertain.”).
57. See DAVID F. BEATTY ET. AL., REDEVELOPMENT IN CALIFORNIA 153 (2d. ed. 1995)
(noting that ground leases are typically used in these plans to reduce upfront costs for developers
and to enable redevelopment agencies to maintain a measure of control over a project after
completion).
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Perhaps a better way to ensure public use is for the state to lease or
sell the property to a private party under terms that “adequately” direct
the uses the lessee or fee owner can make of the property. Such
contractual terms limit private discretion and instead require that
private entities serve government ends. The concern addressed by
specifying uses in contract is that we do not want to authorize a taking
unless the state exercises “enough” control to be classified as an
“owner.” In this regard, what makes the common carrier cases
relatively easy for Justice Thomas is not so much that the public makes
use of the property, but that the state regulates the common carrier.
And, more obviously, privatized prisons operate under state
supervision, and most sports stadium leases specify both permissible
and impermissible uses that can be made of the stadium. If we believe
what makes the public an “owner” of property in the relevant sense is
that it determines how the property is used, then directly looking at the
degree of control the state retains over how property is used might be
the best way to implement Thomas’s vague “state ownership” test.
This control-focused approach is in some ways problematic, and to
some degree is precisely what Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, and
perhaps even the majority in Kelo, demands anyway. It is not clear why
we should accept what otherwise seems like a substantively non-public
project just because the state contracts with a private party to put such
a project into place. Assume that one accepts the proposition that a
municipal airport, which accommodates only private planes, or a
marina used only by owners of expensive pleasure boats is truly a
public project. Assume further that we would forbid the use of eminent
domain to assemble a parcel to be handed over to a private marina
operator or private airport owner. The idea that we rid the project of
its fundamentally private character because the state specifies that a
fundamentally private use will be made is unappealing. Or, to use
examples closer to the heart of the Kelo dissenters, if Detroit had
explicitly contracted with GM to employ a particular number of people
or to attract satellite businesses, then Justice Thomas would probably
remain unsatisfied. At the same time, it is unclear why the private
prison (and even more clearly, the sports stadium) and the
contractually limited GM cases are really so different.
Moreover, it is unclear when a state entity has imposed “enough”
conditions in transferring property to a private party to be what Justices
O’Connor or Thomas would deem an owner (assuming the sort of
contractual direction we would typically see in privatized prison cases
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suffices). Of course, to the degree that the state entity specifies more
precisely how the land grantee must behave and can realistically
enforce the contractual terms, there is a greater chance that the project
will satisfy the public purpose requirement. As a matter of policy,
Detroit almost certainly should have insisted on more punitive
provisions—not only in the transfer of condemned land to GM at the
bargain price of $8 million, but also in the property tax abatement deals.
Contractual penalties for non-performance of its public purpose would
have either given stronger incentives for the company to meet certain
employment goals or at least returned some of the subsidy to the City
if the company had failed to do so. And as a matter of optimal
redevelopment policy, state entities should always employ
redevelopment plans that demand private developers meet community
goals (e.g., by paying living wages, employing a certain number of
people who live locally, revitalizing infrastructure in impoverished
areas proximate to the redevelopment).58
Detailed and enforceable obligations may be best practice, but it is
unclear precisely how much detail there must be in a contract before a
court can conclude that the state entity has failed to do “enough” to
adequately protect its interests or to be “sure enough” (given inevitable
economic uncertainties) that the project will meet the ends the state
entity seeks to meet. Looking back with the benefit of nearly four
decades of hindsight at the Poletown condemnation, we might readily
conclude that GM never employed as many workers as it promised
(peak employment was about 3,000 at the plant itself, and 1,500 at the
time company announced in 2018 that the plant would close, though
the company initially promised closer to 6,000 jobs).59 Even so, it is not
obvious that the deal was a bad one for the City. While it appeared that
the plant would close in early 2020,60 it now appears that it will stay
open, employing more than two thousand workers to assemble new

58. See, e.g., Aaron Mondry, Equitable development across America: How other cities won
community benefits, MODEL D (July 24, 2018), www.modeldmedia.com/features/equitabledevelopment-usa-072318.aspx (detailing development plans in Oakland, Milwaukee, and
Pittsburgh that contractually mandated, rather than merely anticipated, the realization of publicly
important target goals).
59. Tom Gantert, A Cautionary Tale About Job Promises and Corporate Subsidies, MICH.
CAP. CONFIDENTIAL (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.michigancapitolconfidential.com/acautionary-tale-about-job-promises-and-corporate-subsidies.
60. See Jamie L. LaReau, GM: Detroit-Hamtramck plant to stay open 7 months longer than
planned, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.freep.com/story/money/cars/generalmotors/2019/02/22/gm-detroit-hamtramck-workers-impala-cadillac/2950160002/.
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generation electric and autonomous vehicles.61 Even if the Poletown
plant had closed, it would nonetheless have provided thousands of jobs
for more than thirty-five years, and there were doubtless local
multiplier effects associated with these jobs. Whether other businesses
would have either survived or opened that would have provided
anywhere close to that number of jobs in the same rapidly depopulating
area absent the condemnation is obviously a matter of speculation. If it
is difficult to determine, even after the fact, whether a state entity
received enough of the benefits that it formally or informally
contracted to receive when granting control over parcels to a private
entity, it is impossible to imagine how a court at the time of a
condemnation could determine whether the state had retained
“adequate” control over the use of the condemned property to be
deemed its beneficial owner.62
C. Inapplicability of public use doctrine to regulatory takings cases
The Kelo majority wholly ignores the most striking ambiguity in the
Thomas dissent: How, if at all, does Justice Thomas believe his strict
public use test applies to regulatory takings? Regulatory takings
doctrine is implicated when the value of an owner’s property is
significantly diminished by a regulation (e.g., by forbidding some or all
development or capping rent payments) even though the injured party
retains ownership of her property. Would the Thomas dissent bar the
regulatory taking altogether (rather than simply demand that owners
be compensated) in a wide swath of cases because the “property” that
61. See Jamie L. LaReau, GM commits to $2.2 billion investment and 2,200 jobs at DetroitHamtramck Assembly, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.freep.com/story/
money/cars/general-motors/2020/01/27/gm-detroit-hamtramck-poletown-assembly-plantjobs/4564108002/.
62. Justice Kennedy, concurring in Kelo might already demand something like this
“appropriate” level of control-based “ownership,” so that the economic development takings
Justice Thomas opposes might in fact meet Justice Thomas’s own demands, properly understood.
Justice Kennedy does seem to expect an indeterminate level of local government oversight of the
development plan. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 492 (2005) (highlighting the
care with which the development plan was drawn). Alternatively, as the Kelo majority suggests,
the state might demonstrate that the government has adequately protected its public aims because
the most plausible outcome of the private-to-private transfer is that a public aim will be met, even
absent explicit government oversight. See id. at 485 (“Clearly, there is no basis for exempting
economic development from our traditionally broad understanding of public purpose.”). Here
the Court approvingly cites Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), upholding a
program that permitted the EPA to force the transfer of trade secrets among pesticide
manufacturers for just compensation, believing that Congress intended the transfer of trade
secrets to remove a costly barrier to entry in an unduly non-competitive pesticide industry,
though there were no explicit contractual limitations specifying what these second applicants had
to do once they received the data.
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is “taken” is not clearly owned or used by the public? Alternatively,
would Justice Thomas’s logic dictate that the public use test is meant to
apply only to conventional condemnations of real property rather than
to regulation, leaving us with a dual-track public use doctrine? It would
be difficult for any justice—and particularly one like Justice Thomas
who believes strongly in bright-line rules—to justify a system in which
one class of takings (exercises of the eminent domain power) are
subject the Fifth Amendment’s “public use” requirement, while
another class of takings (regulatory takings) are not.
Justice Thomas might argue that states have met his public use test
in the regulatory takings cases in which the state has acquired a nondevelopment servitude, thereby limiting the uses that can be made of
the regulated party’s property. He might do so because he considers the
servitude a form of property that the state now “owns” in some respect.
Alternatively, he might believe that the public “uses” the portions of
the owner’s land that cannot be developed because an owner might
make use of her land by enjoying it in undeveloped form. Consider
three examples in which the Court found a regulatory taking or the
dissenters (whom Judge Thomas would likely have joined) would have
found one. Take Lucas v. S.C. Costal Council,63 which prohibited
development of ecologically-sensitive ocean-front property, or Penn
Central Transportation v. New York City,64 in which the parcel owner is
forbidden to develop in the airspace above a historic landmark
building, or Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty,65 which established
restrictive zoning plans, and forbade commercial development in
neighborhoods zoned as residential and multi-family dwellings in other
zones. In each case, Thomas could conceivably argue that the public or
the government itself now “owned” the relevant non-development
servitude or that the public “used,” say, the space above Grand Central
Terminal or the empty beach property as an undeveloped preserve.66
63. 505 U.S. 1003, 1007–08 (1992).
64. 438 U.S. 104, 115–17 (1978).
65. 272 U.S. 365, 379–82 (1926). The property rights protective movement of the early 21st
century sought not to end zoning, but merely to require compensation for exercises of the zoning
power. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §195.305 (2020) (requiring compensation when any regulation
“restricts the use of real property” unless the restriction abates a public nuisance, protects public
health and safety, or “prohibit[s] the use of the property for selling pornography or performing
nude dancing”). See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §12-1134 (2020); TEX. GOV’T CODE §§2007.0012007.045 (West 2019) (each substantially expanding the rights of owners to receive compensation
when land use is restricted but not barring the restrictions.)
66. It is by no means clear how Justice Thomas would interpret the word “ownership” in the
context of legal interests that were historically thought of as contractual rather than as property
interests. Non-development servitudes—with the exception of a short list of Common Law
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The fact that the public generally would not equally enjoy the benefits
of the servitude would be no more (or less) bothersome than it is in the
standard public ownership of infrastructure cases,67 where some
members of the public benefit far more from the infrastructure than do
others. Still, in these non-development cases severely restricting the
physical use of property, it is at least plausible to claim that that the
public owns (and maybe even uses) the “unused space” that the
regulations create.
There are other cases in which the state entity might “own” a
(mere) restrictive equitable servitude, but in which it is impossible to
think of the public as using undeveloped physical space. Think, for
instance of the canonical Mugler v. Kansas case,68 which addressed a
regulation forbidding the production of alcoholic beverages. The
brewing prohibition rendered nearly worthless a facility that had been
constructed solely for the purpose of brewing beer.69 Assume, contrary
to fact, that the Court had found a compensable taking (as it might well
have). Such a ruling would be grounded in the view that though the

permissible negative easements—were conventionally thought of as contract rights, not property
rights. As a result, state interference with these rights, when privately held, was typically not found
to be a taking of “property” until the latter half of the twentieth century. The traditional position
in California, holding that the state owes no compensation when it makes a use that violates the
terms of a covenant, was articulated in Friesen v. City of Glendale, 288 P. 1080 (1930) and not
overturned until the decision in California Edison Co. v. Bourgerie, 507 P.2d 964 (1973). Older
courts were often quite explicit that right-of-way easements were “property” interests in the sense
that the state had to compensate a party who lost easement-based access as a result of the state’s
project, but that covenants and equitable servitudes established contractual rights that governed
the behavior of the parties to the contract but did not limit the sovereign’s power. See, e.g., Smith
v. Clifton Sanitation Dist., 300 P.2d 548, 550 (Colo. 1956). (“We think it is fundamental that where
a company, corporation, or agency of the state is vested with the right of eminent domain and has
acquired property through eminent domain proceedings and is using the property for public
purposes, no claim for damages arises by virtue of such a covenant as in the instant case, in favor
of the owners of other property on account of such use by the condemnor.”).
Thus, it is not at all clear that the public can “own” a non-development servitude or right that it
could be said to gain from the regulatory taking in the more formalist senses that generally seem
to matter to Justice Thomas, but one can leave that issue aside completely. For functionalists, the
property right/contract right distinction is almost wholly uninteresting: in either case, from a
functionalist vantage, someone has gained a legally-protected entitlement of value to her.
67. See discussion of the problem of unequal benefits, see generally Part IIA, supra. and
particularly the text accompanying notes 48 to 51.
68. See 123 U.S. 623, 662 (1887) (holding that the prohibition regulation was fairly adapted
to protecting the community against the evils of drinking and was therefore a legitimate exerciser
of the police power rather than a compensable taking); see also Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S.
678, 687 (1888) (upholding a regulation limiting the production of margarine based on purported
public health benefits).
69. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 657 (“The buildings and machinery constituting these breweries
are of little value if not used for the purpose of manufacturing beer; that is to say, if the statutes
are enforced against the defendants the value of their property will be materially diminished.”).
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regulatory policy objectives were valid, the regulated parties were
forced to bear a disproportionate share of the burdens of meeting the
state’s Prohibitionist goals. Despite the validity of the public health
policy ambitions, there is nothing resembling public use of the
regulated land—the private owner remains free to exclude others and
to make most any use it wants of the land except alcohol manufacture.
But this suggests the possibility that Justice Thomas would forbid the
regulation barring the manufacture of alcohol rather than merely
require the state to compensate those who bore atypically and unfairly
concentrated losses from the regulation.
Moreover, the Court has decided many other regulatory takings
cases in which the regulation at issue does not resemble the state
acquiring a non-development servitude. In each of these cases, either
the majority or the dissenters believe there has been a compensable
taking. But even those justices who believe that the regulation requires
compensation have not argued that the regulatory taking should be
barred altogether. Outright prohibitions on these compensable
regulatory takings are not contemplated even though there is neither
anything resembling public use of the regulated property nor public
ownership of an asset. If Justice Thomas is serious that takings should
be barred when the public does not directly employ whatever the
private party has given up, all of these regulatory takings should be
forbidden, rather than permitted with compensation. Here are some of
the obvious examples:
• A variety of rent control cases uphold uncompensated rent
control, over dissents that Justice Thomas would likely
support, even though the direct beneficiaries of the
regulations are clearly the tenants themselves.70 The general
70. See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921) (upholding wartime statute rent control
legislation allowing tenants to not vacate once their leases expired); see also Pennell v. City of San
Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 12 (1988) (“We have long recognized that a legitimate and rational goal of price
or rate regulation is the protection of consumer welfare.”). Note that many early twentieth
century judges with Thomas’s narrow view of the “public use” requirement found that the
condemnations should be forbidden altogether, without regard to compensation, when state
entities first seized property to build public housing; public housing programs, like rent control
most obviously benefit the occupants of the housing. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Lands, 9
F. Supp. 137, 142 (W.D. Ky. 1935) (rejecting public housing as a “public use” on the grounds that
it would not house governmental activities and would not be available to the entire public on
equal terms), aff’d, 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935). But see, e.g., N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1
N.E.2d 153, 155 (N.Y. 1936) (“Use of a proposed structure, facility or service by everybody and
anybody is one of the abandoned universal tests of a public use.”). However, the dissenting judges
in Block did not argue that the rent control statute was not for public use. See Block, 256 U.S. at
168 (McKenna, J., dissenting) (“Call [the rent control statute] what you will–an exertion of police
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public does not enjoy the benefits of rent reduction in any
direct way, nor do the ordinances facilitate the use of the
leased premises by the public. Instead, the public benefits are
diffuse, and the purposes of rent control schemes are some
mix of redistribution, protection of the continuity interests of
incumbent tenants, neighborhood preservation, and
socioeconomic diversity promotion.71
In a range of eviction-related regulatory takings cases, some
of which found that the state must compensate those owners
deprived of the prior right to evict,72 the direct beneficiaries
are the tenants who cannot be evicted or the homeowners
who cannot be foreclosed upon.73 Members of the public
generally gain no access rights to the units that the protected
tenants (or delinquent mortgagors) can now directly enjoy.
In the cases involving federal legislation that abrogated the
right of Native owners to freely pass along highly fractionated
property by descent or will,74 the direct beneficiaries of the
regulation were other owners of tenancy-in-common shares
in the property. Post-regulation, these tenants-in-common
would own a larger share of the once-highly-fractionated
property. The public would not gain access to the property
(which the fractionated owner lost her interest in) and would
only benefit in the same indirect ways it arguably does in

or other power–nothing can absolve it from illegality.”). Later commentaries on rent control cases
reflect the Block dissent. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Yee v. City of Escondido: The Supreme
Court Strikes out Again, 26 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 3, 8–9 (1992) (not challenging a rent control statute
on grounds that it wasn’t for public use but simply demanding that owners be compensated).
71. For qualified defenses of rent control, averting to these ends, see Ken Hanly, The Ethics
of Rent Control. 10 J. BUS. ETHICS 189 (1991); Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 350 (1986).
72. In some cases, no compensable taking was found. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S.
519, 537 (1992) (determining that the question presented before the Court regarded a
compensated physical, not regulatory, taking); see also Flynn v. City of Cambridge, 418 N.E.2d
335, 339 (Mass. 1981) (holding that interference with just one property right does not, by itself,
establish a taking). Yet in others, Courts overturned statutes barring eviction because they did
not offer just compensation for the restriction of the eviction right but did not argue that antieviction statues would be impermissible even if compensation were provided, despite the absence
of clear “public use.” See Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1989); see
also Cwynar v. City of San Francisco, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 233, 251 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
73. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444–45 (1934) (statute
precluding lenders from foreclosing was constitutional). This case raised issues outside the scope
of this piece about whether the regulation impaired the mortgage contracts as well as Takings
issues.
74. See Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 241, 244–45 (1997) (determining that a federal law
limiting the descent of fractional land interests to other current owners constitutes a taking).
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Kelo-style cases (i.e., the regulation promises more efficient
allocation of property).
• In cases in which marketable title acts or legislatively-enacted
time limits on the life of possibilities of reverter or rights of
entry wipe out future interests in property,75 it is obviously
plausible to argue that those whose interests are wiped out
should receive compensation.76 But, once again, no one
challenging these regulations – designed to facilitate efficient
use of property by removing clouds on title and to dampen
“dead hand” control concerns – argued that they were simply
impermissible (even with compensation) because they
directly benefitted only those holding property interests that
had been burdened by these future interests prior to the
enactment of the regulations and gave the public no
ownership interests or access rights to any property.
It is highly unlikely that Justice Thomas would jettison the
compensation requirement for regulatory takings, given legitimate
concerns that individuals or small groups ought not be singled out to
bear a disproportionate share of burdens that ought to be borne by the
public as a whole.77 Unless, though, he is willing to abandon his
preferred version of the public use requirement for a sub-set of acts he
would like to dub compensable takings, thereby violating his usual
Formalist commitments, he would need to bar these regulatory acts
altogether because none of them results in public ownership or
employment of the seized property interests. But nothing in existing
case law, or in anything Justice Thomas has written, suggests that
75. One can best think of such laws functionally as regulating disposition rights, even though
they eliminate interests that could ripen into full-blown fees, with the concomitant powers to
exclude and use as well as re-convey. But what such laws do, at core, is limit the capacity of the
initial grantor of these disfavored rights to have undue control over the future use of the property
and to dispose of the property in a fashion that, by clouding title, interferes with the ready
alienability of property. Though an “estate” is nominally taken by the government, the functional
impact of the statutes is not very different than the impact sought in Common Law rules against
certain restraints on alienation which plainly define the permissible borders of free disposition.
76. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Miles, 207 N.E.2d 181, 185 (N.Y. 1965) (holding that owners of
unrecorded reversionary interests must be compensated because the state’s efforts simply to
abolish them without compensation is an invalid use of the police power). But see Black Mountain
Energy Corp. v. Bell Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 467 F. Supp. 2d 715, 721 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (upholding a
statute that, without compensation, eliminated a possibility of reverter because it gave owners
five years to file a declaration to preserve it).
77. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (“The Fifth Amendment’s
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was
designed to bar . . . forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”).
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barring these regulations altogether is a serious option.
Justice Thomas’s public use test focuses on the question of who has
access to physical space. When land is condemned, one might try to
ascertain who has access to that land after the taking. But it is difficult
to fathom how the test can be applied to a regulatory regime that alters
use and disposition rights rather than simpler access and exclusion
rights.
Another core problem with applying the “public use” requirement
to the regulatory takings context is that it is inconsistent with the
Court’s treatment of tax-and-spend plans. The Court has neither
recognized that regulations impose implicit taxes or quasi-taxes (just
like condemnations of land) nor that these regulations establish
implicit spending programs—since the beneficiaries of the regulation
have received benefits funded by those who bear the costs of regulatory
compliance. It is effectively impossible to determine whether explicit
tax-based spending plans are “adequately” broadly distributed to be
understood as transparently “public.” This is true not only because no
spending plan distributes benefits evenly across a community,78 but
because redistribution is a legitimate government end.79 These
regulatory schemes may not be explicit tax-and-spend plans, but there
is no reason to demand something mythically public when the tax-and-

78. Courts have wisely chosen to leave to legislatures the determination of whether
spending projects are legitimate even when benefits are plainly quite unevenly distributed,
sometimes realistically serving a nameable and finite group of beneficiaries: Consider, for
instance, some typical infrastructure projects (airports built for the use of private planes,
decelerator lanes that serve a single shopping center, sewage connection funded out of tax funds
rather than user fees); housing projects that largely benefit occupants; projects to make public
spaces more accessible to those who use wheelchairs to meet mobility needs that may sometimes
be of modest or no benefit to those who do not.
But think, too, of a more complicated web of spending projects and regulations designed to curb
climate change. It is important to recognize that both the spending projects (tax subsidies for
electric cars or renewable electricity generation; public carbon capture facilities; mass transit) and
regulations (forbidding the use of cheaper carbon-emitting sources; mandatory disclosure of the
carbon footprint of a product) both garner resources from some inhabitants to meet an end whose
benefits will inevitably be unevenly distributed (those in low-lying coastal areas or other more
weather-vulnerable areas may gain a good deal more than some others, for instance.) The natural
inclination is to believe that legislatures making fundamentally non-reviewable judgments about
whether the projects generate adequate “public benefit” prevail whether they are meeting their
ends through tax-and-spend or through regulation. If certain regulations unduly concentrate
costs, though, so that they should be considered compensable takings, we might effectively limit
the state to the use of tax-and-spend since the regulatory methods would be banned if Thomas’s
“public use” test were applied to the regulations.
79. Redistributive policies are designed to directly materially benefit some while materially
harming others, even if one thinks the directly harmed parties receive an indirect benefit (e.g.,
increased social cohesion and conflict reduction) from the egalitarian shift.
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spend programs become implicit. If housing vouchers and subsidies are
“public” enough (though the immediate beneficiaries are plainly just a
small sub-set of the population), so is rent control, although its direct
beneficiaries are again the favored occupants of rent-controlled
housing. And then condemnations are just taxes, too, with the seized
land resources used or spent in a project of the government’s choosing.
Are there reasons to scrutinize tax-and-spend cases less critically
than we scrutinize condemnations to ensure that the public is served by
the government’s actions? When a city pursues a GM plant or a
pharmaceutical research facility (or, to take the poster child case of this
last decade, Amazon’s HQ2), should it matter in constitutional terms
whether the resources it uses to woo the private developer come in the
form of tax abatements, direct subsidies (e.g., selling land, however
acquired, at below-market value), or indirect subsidies (e.g.,
construction of otherwise unnecessary infrastructure, like roads or
utility connections or heliports for top Amazon executives), rather than
condemned land? If we differentiate the use of taken property from the
use of tax money, should we scrutinize regulatory takings like taxes or
like real property condemnations?
The next section considers and rejects the most plausible reasons to
differentiate the cases. It pays scant attention to the textual argument
offered in the Thomas dissent itself, focusing instead on functionalist,
policy-grounded arguments that might be used to justify the state
legislation mirroring Thomas’s position.
III. DISTINGUISHING TAX-AND-SPEND FROM CONDEMN-AND-USE
We plainly could police how state entities employ condemned
property differently than we limit how state entities can use tax or
regulatory quasi-tax funds. The question of whether courts should do
so might be answered by reference to constitutional text, given that
there are colorable textual arguments, briefly addressed below, for
making the distinction. State legislatures that restricted the
condemnation power in the wake of Kelo should police the use of
condemned property differently than they police the use of explicit
taxation only if there are persuasive functional policy reasons to do so.
The remainder of Section III examines possible policy reasons and
finds them all wanting.
At core, the argument that courts must discipline the use of
resources gained through condemnation far more than they oversee the
use of tax funds is grounded in a textual hook: that the Framers
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differentiated the spending power, which must merely be exercised for
the “general Welfare,” from the condemnation power, which can only
be exercised for “public use.”80 In this view, constitutional limits on the
spending power are facially less restrictive than the limits on the
condemnation power.81 So, tax subsidies or government spending
programs that are arguably “private” are constitutionally protected,
while the condemnation power is more cabined. Again, I set aside both
the normative debate about originalism’s merits and demerits, and the
question of whether we can clearly divine in this particular context how
the Framers’ references to “taxes” on the one hand and “takings” on
the other were understood when the relevant texts were adopted. Thus,
the remainder of the section instead addresses policy-oriented,
functionalist arguments that presumably motivated state legislatures
adopting Justice Thomas’s position and motivate some judges as well.82
80. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 509 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The
Framers would have used some. . .broader term if they had meant the Public Use Clause to have
a similarly sweeping scope.”). To support his proposition, Justice Thomas notes that some original
state constitutions required takings be for “public use,” while others required “public necessity”
or “public exigencies.” Id. at 509–10. Here, Justice Thomas relies on Nathan Alexander Sales,
Classical Republicanism and the Fifth Amendment’s “Public Use” Requirements, 49 DUKE L.J.
339, 367–68 (1999). However, Thomas overlooks Sales’s argument that public projects appearing
to benefit a select few were justified by the Civic Republican legal fiction that the entire public
shared common aims.
81. Like Justice Thomas’s Kelo dissent, Justice Ryan’s in Poletown relied on state
constitutional text and on history:
Well over a century ago, a clear line of demarcation was drawn between the powers of
eminent domain and taxation, setting the jurisprudences of the [T]akings [C]lause and,
if you will, the “taxing clause” on separate, independent courses. What is “public” for
one is not necessarily “public” for the other.
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 662 (1981) (Ryan, J.,
dissenting). However, the canonical cases that differentiated the two powers thought the taxing
power more restrictive because those who are taxed get no compensation whatsoever. The
canonical Michigan opinion articulating this idea is Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333, 339 (Mich.
1877).
82. Skepticism about our capacity to apply what are considered original public meanings of
texts to novel and unforeseen situations resonates in Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the
Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 555 (2006). Other powerful attacks on different
forms of originalism include Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,
60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996); Mitchell Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1–8, 37–68
(2009).
Even if the Framers deliberately distinguished the permissible aims of tax-funded public spending
(promoting the “general Welfare”) from those of eminent domain (“public use”), it is extremely
dubious that they made these distinctions adverting to situations that could not have been
conceived of when the text was written. (For example, did they consider anything resembling
property tax abatements negotiated with particular parties – plainly an exercise of the spending
power if it must be classed an exercise of either the tax or eminent domain power – when they
purportedly established that such abatements need only serve the “general Welfare”? Did they
think about whether entities like today’s charter schools (or privatized prisons or post office-
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A. Functionalist policy-driven arguments
1. Concerns about under-compensation in the functionalist
arguments
There are several functionalist arguments that might bolster the
Kelo dissenters’ claim that the power to spend tax money should be
more capacious than the power to utilize condemned real property. The
arguments for more closely scrutinizing condemnations take four basic
forms:
1. Ameliorating Under-Compensation: A strict public use
requirement is needed to ensure that those people whose
property is condemned are actually appropriately
compensated.83
2. Preventing Undue Influence by The Politically Powerful: In
another view, the strict public use requirement protects
against a variety of political malfunctions: unduly influential
interests will overwhelm the powerless and use eminent
domain to expropriate their resources for private benefit. This
concern is drastically reduced when the public must use or
own the condemned property.84
3. Precluding Inefficient Transfers: A strong public use test is
needed to ensure that condemned property is actually more
highly valued by the acquirers than it is valued by those who

substitutes like FedEx or UPS) should be considered public or private institutions? It is worth
noting as well that Justice Thomas joined the majority in in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 612–14 (2013), holding (quite persuasively) that conditioning a
development permit on the surrender of funds (to purchase conservation easements) constitutes
a taking (just as the transfer of an easement on the regulated party’s land would be) if – under the
standards articulated in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) – what the permit seeker was
asked to contribute in order to receive a permit grant was substantially disproportionate to what
he would need to contribute to undo the adverse impact of development. If state entities, on the
one hand, either condemn land (or lower its value unduly in the regulatory takings case) and, on
an entirely separate hand, get money only through the exercise of the power to collect taxes, then
the demand for money should have been treated as a tax, as the Koontz dissenters believed.
Koontz, 570 U.S. at 623–29 (J. Kagan, dissenting). The Koontz holding acknowledges what
Thomas refuses to see in Kelo: that the lines between taxes and condemnations (and, for that
matter, regulations) are best thought of as either blurry or imaginary.
83. This argument is presented most forcefully in Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent
Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 987–90 and in Krier & Serkin, supra note 55, at 865–
68.
84. See supra Part II.B (discussing Justice Thomas’s functionalist argument). It is also
mooted in Fennell, supra note 83, at 967–71, and a variant of this sort of argument is offered by
Dana, supra note 38, at 152–54.
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are subject to eminent domain.85 There is inevitably a risk of
inefficient transfers in the eminent domain context because
those losing property are unwilling sellers subject to coercive
or forced sales requirements.
4. Assuaging Those Asked to Make Sacrifices: The level of
justification required to impose a loss on someone depends
on the degree to which the party is singled out to bear the loss
or the degree to which the loss is an especially profound or
deep one. In this view, the “public use” requirement might be
seen as a proxy for a public project with the high level of
justification required to assuage those whose property is
taken, who are presumed to have borne losses that are both
atypical and large.86
These functionalist arguments play out differently depending on
assumptions about the adequacy of compensation for condemnations
of homes, condemnations of businesses, and compensation for
regulatory takings. To illustrate with the simplest example: Suppose we
believe that condemnees are fully compensated and that we are obliged
to provide especially strong justification for the most serious
deprivations. If that is the case, then there is less reason to apply a public
use test to condemnations than to taxes because fully compensated
condemnees (by definition) have lost nothing at all. Those condemnees
are, in theory, in the same position as they were prior to condemnation.
Taxpayers, however, have lost something in the sense that they would
prefer not to pay the tax because they would enjoy the benefits of
85. This argument is most explicit in Thomas S. Ulen, The Public Use of Private Property:
A Dual-Constraint Theory of Efficient Governmental Takings, in TAKING PROPERTY AND JUST
COMPENSATION: LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVES OF THE TAKINGS ISSUE 163, 174
(Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1992). It is mirrored to some degree in Thomas J. Miceli, Free riders,
holdouts, and public use: a tale of two externalities, 148 PUB. CHOICE 105, 115 (2009), though
Miceli explicitly rejects the idea that Thomas’s test meets these goals. Id.
86. This argument is made most explicitly in Micah Elezar, “Public Use” and the Justification
of Takings, 7 J. CONST. L. 249, 254–56, 265–66 (2004), but is also an important aspect of Justice
Ryan’s Poletown dissent:
As a general proposition then, in the realm of aid to private corporations, “public
purpose” (taxation) has been construed less restrictively than “public use” (eminent
domain). The distinction is fully justified. The character of governmental interference
with the individual in the case of taxation is wholly different from the case of eminent
domain. The degree of compelled deprivation of property is manifestly less intrusive in
the former case: it is one thing to disagree with the purposes for which one’s tax money
is spent; it is quite another to be compelled to give up one’s land and be required, as in
this case, to leave what may well be a lifelong home and community. Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 666 (1981) (Ryan, J.,
dissenting).
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public spending projects even if they did not contribute tax revenue.
But it is certainly plausible that owners of real property would be
under-compensated if they received merely the fair market value of the
condemned property.87 Homeowners will often be under-compensated
in part because the subjective value that they place on the property is
higher than its “fair market” value. They will not receive the consumer
surplus. The fact that they often value it more than its market value is
itself a product of diverse factors: For instance, potential buyers who
determine the fair market value will lack the personal, emotional
attachments to the home that the condemnee may have;88 the
condemnee may have made site-specific improvements suited to her
own tastes or benefit from the location in a way that would-be buyers
may not value.89
Condemnees may be under-compensated not only because they
subjectively value the seized parcel more than the market does, but also
because condemnation at fair market value strips them of the
opportunity to bargain for some of the economic surplus gained by the
post-condemnation developer (the increased value of the land after
state-coordinated redevelopment). If we imagine that the seller and
buyer of property are in a bilateral monopoly relationship, a buyer with
the condemnation power gets all of the development surplus. Many will
think it unfair to divide the development surplus so that the innocent
party gets nothing while the more culpable one gets all the gains.

87. See Fennell, supra note 83, at 962–66 (summarizing the under-compensation problem
and identifying three items of value left uncompensated by eminent domain: the transferor’s
subjective premium, their chance at surplus, and their autonomy).
88. Many commentators only emphasize this one aspect of the under-compensation
problem, See, e.g., Ulen, supra note 85, at 167–68. Justice Ryan also emphasizes such personal
attachments in his Poletown dissent. See Poletown, 410 Mich. at 682 (Ryan, J., dissenting)
(“Eminent domain . . . can entail . . . intangible losses, such as severance or personal attachments
to one’s domicile and neighborhood . . . .”).
89. Statutory provisions may provide compensation for moving costs or the search costs in
locating new housing (although not for the search costs that follow relocation, like finding new
service providers). See, e.g., the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition
Policies Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4622 (2018) (mandating moving costs be paid when real property is
condemned by the federal government); CAL. GOV. CODE § 7262 (Deering 2020) (person
displaced by eminent domain is entitled to payment for such actual moving and related expenses
as the public entity determines to be reasonable and necessary). But such provisions are not
constitutionally mandated. See United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 378–79 (1946).
Absent such statutory provisions – provisions that were in place, for instance, for the condemnees
in the Poletown case – homeowners will not receive compensation for moving or search costs,
further ensuring that they will not be fully indemnified when their property is seized.
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Finally, those whose property is condemned face an uncompensated
loss of autonomy.90 They have no real choice in the matter: They do not
get to meaningfully decide to part from their home. Condemnees do
not get the opportunity to hold out for a better deal or just to stay put.
Moreover, the loss of autonomy is fundamentally a loss not truly
commensurable with compensation.91
Business-owner condemnees may lose goodwill and other aspects
of going-concern value absent legislative schemes that compensate for
such losses.92 But the legislative schemes will still struggle to account
for sentimental losses. It is, though, considerably less plausible that
sentimental losses would be at all widespread among owners of
businesses, and uncommon for seized businesses to possess site-specific
goodwill.
Under-compensation is plausible in a small sub-set of regulatory
takings. An affected landowner might value a prohibited use of land
more than a buyer would pay at fair market value. Some owners would
not have forfeited the opportunity to proceed with the barred
development in exchange for the difference between the pre-regulation
and post-regulation property value. As a result, paying them the postregulation decreased market value (the measure of compensation in
regulatory takings cases)93 does not account for the owner’s subjective

90. Arguably, taxpayers forfeit autonomous control over whether to transfer resources too.
Whether the purported autonomy losses in a condemnation are worthy of greater attention than
those incurred through taxes is a hard question.
91. The libertarian case for property rules protecting against forced transfer at fair market
value is set out clearly in Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of
Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091 (1997). The view is accepted by many who would not generally
characterize themselves as libertarians. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 83, at 966–67.
92. For the canonical discussion of the traditional limits on judicial and statutory efforts to
compensate for the loss of going concern value (the gap between the value of a concern as an
ongoing business and its liquidation value) and goodwill (the value inhering in the tendency of
existing customers to continue to purchase from the particular business) and a guide to some of
the reform efforts that began in the late twentieth century, see generally Lynda J. Oswald,
Goodwill and Going-Concern Value: Emerging Factors in the Just Compensation Equation, 32
B.C. L. REV. 283 (1991). For further discussions of going concern value and its calculation, see
generally, Merle F. Dimbath, The Theory and Practical Determination of Going Concern Value, 7
J. FORENSIC ECON. 171 (1994) (discussing calculation of business value).
93. See generally Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation
for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677 (2005) (discussing issues in implementing a market
value compensation rule in regulatory takings cases); See also Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete
Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 110, 121–24 (2002) (arguing that the “decline
in market value” compensation model draws on the model typically used in partial takings cases,
in which condemnees receive compensation for both the adverse consequences of the taking and
for the property itself, and thereby comes closer to providing full-bore indemnification for
regulatory takings).
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loss. This is true for the same reason that a plaintiff in a particular
nuisance or trespass suit might not have been willing to tolerate an
incursion if compensated for lost market value94 or why some future
interest holders (in what are dubbed ameliorative waste cases)95 or
tenants in common (resisting partition by sale rather than physical
division of property)96 might prefer to make the use of the property
they most desired, even if they would receive fair market value
compensation if they were forced to make a non-preferred use or
tolerate an unwanted use by another. Still, businesses with regulatory
takings claims (due to use restrictions or, even more surely, price
ceilings) would typically be fully compensated by accounting for
straightforward lost income and lost property value.
At any rate, none of the functional arguments for a strict public use
requirement make much sense on their own terms. More importantly
the functional arguments do not adequately distinguish the legitimate
concerns of condemnees from the concerns of ordinary taxpayers.
2. Does a strict public use requirement correct for undercompensation?
The argument that we need a strict public use requirement to
correct for under-compensation naturally starts with the premise that
property owners are indeed often under-compensated—that
condemnees would not voluntarily sell the condemned property for its
fair market value.97 This assumption is reasonable, even though there
are significant reasons to believe the under-compensation problem is

94. See, e.g., Glavin v. Eckman, 881 N.E.2d 820, 824 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (“[T]he wrongful
cutting [of a tree] may represent a significant loss to the property owner . . . even where the value
of the timber cut is negligible, or the diminution in value of the property . . . is minimal or
nonexistent.”).
95. See, e.g., Brokaw v. Fairchild, 237 N.Y.S. 6, 14–15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1929) (permitting
remaindermen to block conversion of a residence into an economically more valuable apartment).
Note the persuasive argument that plaintiffs who succeeded in ameliorative waste cases won
because in a world with weak surveying techniques, changes made to land (however valueincreasing) indeed threatened their ability to derive economic value from their remainder because
they risked losing title to some portion of the land. Only rarely did plaintiffs prevail by focusing
on their subjective valuation. This argument is made particularly persuasively in Jill M. Fraley, A
New History of Waste Law: How a Misunderstood Doctrine Shaped Ideas About the
Transformation of Law, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 861, 881–83 (2017).
96. See, e.g., Ark Land Co. v. Harper, 599 S.E.2d 754, 761–62 (W. Va. 2004) (ruling that
tenants in common may request partition in kind when they have emotional ties to a property,
even if it would not maximize property value).
97. See Fennell, supra note 83, at 958–59 (explaining the existence of an “uncompensated
increment”—a gap between fair market value and the reservation price of the condemnee); see
also Krier & Serkin, supra note 55, at 866.
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often overstated: The combination of formal super-compensation laws
and informal practices designed to overcome opposition to public
projects means that, in most cases, more adequate compensation is
offered.98
The role that a strict public use requirement might play in
correcting for under-compensation is seemingly straightforward. When
property is taken, a parcel owner receives explicit monetary
compensation, which, by hypothesis here, is inadequate. But, depending
on how the property is used, she may also receive implicit in-kind
compensation—her “share” of the value of the project. If the project is
not a “public” one, and she has no access to the project, she will receive
nothing by way of implicit in-kind compensation. But if she has access
to whatever public project emerges, then she gets some value from the
use of the condemned property (e.g., she gets some value from using
the road or park situated on her condemned property). The sum of
explicit and implicit compensation may then be adequate.99
But this implicit compensation theory does not support Justice
Thomas’s strict public use requirement—nor does it bolster the case for
scrutinizing public spending more deferentially than we scrutinize the
use of property seized in eminent domain proceedings. Three
observations support this conclusion.
First, requiring any sort of public use of seized property cannot
possibly solve the problem of under-compensation if that problem is as
dire as many suggest. Even assuming a public project that delivers pro
98. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105
MICH. L. REV. 101, 104–05 (2006) (arguing that under compensation is an overstated problem
because takers are often incentivized and even legally obligated to negotiate with owners and
provide relocation assistance). Consistent with Garnett’s views, when the Poletown condemnees
older than 60 were surveyed, a full 92 percent thought that the monetary compensation they had
received was fair. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 33. It is worth noting as well
that at least in relationship to homeowners, one of the most commonplace arguments that
condemnation under-compensates—that it does not account for the impact of being uprooted—
seems, at least on its face, to be overstated because 11 percent of Americans (and about 5 percent
of homeowners) move each year on average, for a number of reasons. U.S. Census Bureau,
Geographical Mobility: 2015-2016 tbl. 1. (Nov. 2016), https://www.census.gov/content/census/
en/data/tables/2016/demo/geographic-mobility/cps-2016.html.
99. If the main reason to retain a strong public use requirement is to alleviate undercompensation, having no clear answer on whether Thomas’s version of strict public use is meant
to apply to regulatory takings would be unimportant—assuming that under-compensation is less
prevalent in regulatory takings. But if a “strong” public use requirement is helpful only in
categories of cases where under-compensation is most often an issue, it might make sense to
dispense with the requirement when businesses, rather than homes, are taken. However, the Kelo
dissents suggest no such distinction would be drawn. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469, 494 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 505 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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rata benefits to every member of the public, these pro rata benefits
cannot possibly balance out the losses borne by the property owner
forced to vacate her home. Assume, as do typical state laws offering
super-compensation for seized homes, that homeowners are undercompensated by 25 percent if they receive only fair market value of
their homes.100 For a home sold at roughly the American median price
(about $330,000),101 a reasonable estimate of the “uncompensated
increment” (the gap between fair market value and reservation price)
is $82,500. It is simply inconceivable that the pro rata share of the gains
from any particular public project would be anywhere close to $82,500.
Second, there is no particular relationship between imposing the
strict public use test (as opposed to the looser public benefit test) and
guaranteeing that the condemnee has received adequate implicit inkind compensation (the value of the public project to the condemnee).
Any particular condemnee in Poletown might well gain more
personally from the GM plant’s economic stimulus than he would gain
from any particular conventional public works project. He might be
helped a great deal if the economic development project permitted him
to keep his job but not use the road or park or have been willing to
offer anything to expand military or prison capacity.
Third, if we assume it is problematic that a particular property
owner receives no implicit in-kind compensation from a particular sort
of “non-public project,” then it is also certainly problematic that
taxpayer dollars are expropriated to help finance such projects. Of
course, the amount of tax money that any one taxpayer devotes to a
wholly private subsidy is relatively trivial: Each taxpayer’s bill may rise
only marginally to account for property tax abatements (like those
Detroit gave to GM) or to fund the infrastructure constructed for a
private user. Likewise, though, we only trivially correct whatever real
under-compensation problem there is if we insist on “public uses.” 102
100. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2 (amended 2006) (providing, “If private property
consisting of an individual’s principal residence is taken for public use, the amount of
compensation made and determined for that taking shall be not less than 125% of that property’s
fair market value, in addition to any other reimbursement allowed by law.”); see also Brian
Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent Domain, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 593, 634–35, 645–49 (2013) (discussing state eminent domain provisions and
critiquing academic pieces that support super compensation requirements).
101. See Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Median Sales Price of Houses Sold for the United
States, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MSPUS (2020) (citing U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Dep’t
of Housing and Urban Development).
102. There are a host of ways to deal explicitly with under-compensation rather than relying
on implicit in-kind compensation to do the work. There are problems I will not rehearse with each
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But if it is worth worrying about the condemnee’s lost opportunity to
enjoy trivial pro rata gains from a truly public project, then we should
worry about the small losses that a taxpayer funding non-public
projects suffers.
3. Does a strict public use test restrain the capacity of powerful
private actors to appropriate resources and reduce incentives to engage
in rent seeking?
Justice Thomas argues that the strict public use requirement is a
necessary check on powerful parties who wish to condemn land for
their own private gain. Once again, the argument is both theoretically
implausible and inconsistent with past experience. Imagine a greedy
corporation desiring some mix of (condemnation-acquired) land, tax
abatements, and explicit subsidies. If we are worried about the
company getting its way due to limited organized opposition, one
would presume that the company would prioritize seeking tax
abatements and subsidies over seeking land through eminent domain.
If, then, we are worried about undue influence at all, courts should
worry more about undue influence over abatements and subsidies than
condemnations.
Assume, first, that at least some non-trivial portion of property
owners would be under-compensated if their land is condemned for the
benefit of Greedy Corp. Assume, on the other hand, that when tax
money is expended, no particular citizen loses much; the losses are
small for each individual and diffused across the population. On the
other hand, Greedy Corp. receives the sorts of concentrated benefits
that make the company a highly engaged, readily organized political
player. Mainstream public choice theory asserts that Greedy Corp. will
be less successful if it is trying to concentrate harms on a few rather
than spread them among many. Each individual facing losses would
face massive free rider problems in organizing opposition.103 The free
rider effects are enormously powerful even if a tax subsidy is large

of the proposed mechanisms—e.g., simply giving a bonus above fair market value; making
property owners pre-declare the subjective value of their homes by having them pay property
taxes on subjective value; dividing the development surplus more fairly by granting condemnees
various sorts of equity interests in economic development projects. For some discussions of
mechanisms and problems, see Fennell, supra note 83, at 992–1002; Krier & Serkin, supra note
55, at 868–73; and Ulen, supra note 85, at 180–83.
103. Moreover, if the losses are small, the private costs of opposing the plan might exceed the
private gains one would reap if the plan were defeated.
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enough to impose significant losses on each taxpayer.104 This point is
hardly a novel one.105
If, instead, condemnees are truly adequately compensated, to the
point where they are indifferent between the status quo (keeping their
property) and condemnation with compensation, they have absolutely
no motive to organize to oppose an eminent domain plan.106 So, Greedy
Corp. would enjoy relatively free reign. Nevertheless, taxpayers may
still oppose the project in precisely the same way they would oppose
explicit subsidies. If a state’s goal is to impose strict public use
requirements to mitigate political influence asymmetries, then there is
no reason to defer to spending-side subsidization but to strictly police
the use of condemnation. The political battle is seemingly similar in
each case, although condemnation plans often draw more attention and
blowback than tax abatements, both because condemnation plans
produce attention-grabbing “identifiable victim effects”107 and because
no funds must be explicitly appropriated to grant Greedy Corp. an
abatement (contrary to takings, which require budgeted expenditures).

104. For instance, if Amazon accepted New York City’s offer of approximately $3 billion in
subsidies, the per capita loss for each New Yorker would have been more than $400. See Jon
Campbell, Amazon HQ2: $3 billion in state, city tax breaks draws company to New York,
DEMOCRAT & CHRONICLE (Nov. 13, 2018, 10:27 AM), https://www.democratandchronicle.com/
story/news/politics/albany/2018/11/13/new-york-amazon-incentives-billion/1986979002/.
105. See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints
on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 394–95 (1996) (noting the explicit
relation between free rider effects and tax incentives). See also Richard C. Schragger, Cities,
Economic Development, and the Free Trade Constitution, 94 VA. L. REV. 109, 1138–40, 1146
(2008) (sketching the conventional public choice perspective in relationship to local decision
making more generally). What Schragger adds, so perceptively, to the usual discussion of the
maldistribution of political power is that when it comes to the choice of mechanisms a
municipality can use to aid a private corporation – say, the choice between tax abatements worth
$X million and assistance through eminent domain in assembling a parcel for $X million less than
it otherwise could be assembled by the company on its own, overcoming holdouts – there is lots
to be said for the use of eminent domain. Tax incentives tend to be a zero-sum game (the city that
wins simply hurts another city) while (at least on occasions when hold outs might otherwise block
a project and the company substitutes an inferior site) eminent domain actually can increase
overall productivity. Id. at 1137–38 (noting that cities choosing tax incentives over eminent
domain tends to be a zero sum game in which the city that attracts a company hurts another city,
and its tax incentives are often not offset by local economic benefits).
106. See Glynn Lunney, A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 1892, 1946–59 (1992) (discussing the motivation and organization of collective response to
legislatively-initiated eminent domain takings); Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just
Compensation, 12 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 125, 131–32 (1992) (noting that an under-appreciated
virtue of full compensation is that it precludes concentrated opponents of a justified taking from
blocking an action that generates diffuse benefits).
107. Karen E. Jenni & George Loewenstein, Explaining the “Identifiable Victim Effect,” 14
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 235 (1997) (describing a behavioral phenomenon causing people to
spend more money to save the life of an identified victim than an anonymous one).
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Not only will condemnees more effectively mobilize than will diffuse
taxpayers, condemnees plainly have legal standing to challenge a
condemnation, not only on constitutional grounds (the condemned
property will not be publicly used) but for a host of narrower
procedural reasons. On the other hand, taxpayers, generally, do not
have standing to challenge tax abatements.108
It is difficult to show empirically that condemnation plans
invigorate more organized and effective opposition than spending-side
tax abatements, subsidies, and targeted infrastructure spending plans.
But in condemnations, the problem of asymmetrical attention by
winners and losers is far less common—instead, both sides of the
dispute are often equally engaged. The Poletown controversy is an
obvious case. The takings received far more political heat than the
massive spending-side giveaways to GM did; it was Poletown residents
and allies, not Detroit taxpayers writ large, who organized to resist the
subsidy-heavy plan. Similarly, though there were certainly political
pressures to limit the extent of cities’ giveaways for Amazon in the
HQ2 competition, there is no evidence of more generalized outrage
like that generated by the Kelo condemnations. Of course, there are
Right libertarians and Left populists who categorically object to
corporate subsidies,109 and many economists have argued that the
subsidies are ineffective even for particular localities110 and do even less
to promote overall productivity.111 But we are not seeing law review
symposia on HQ2 the way we saw them on Poletown and Kelo, much
less commercial films heavily promoted by the property rights-

108. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 345 (2006). There may, though, be
some situations in which competing businesses can make dormant Commerce Clause attacks on
tax deals that unduly favor locals. For a comparison between standing claims that can be made by
individual taxpayers and disfavored businesses, see Enrich, supra note 106, at 409–18.
109. See, e.g., Derek Thompson, Amazon’s HQ2 Spectacle Isn’t Just Shameful – It Should Be
Illegal, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/idea/archive/2018/11/
amazons-hq2-spectacle-should-be-illegal/575539/ (arguing that a mix of federal bans and changes
in tax laws would have the desirable effect of eliminating local government subsidies for
businesses designed to alter location decisions).
110. See Alan Peters & Peter Fisher, The Failures of Economic Development Incentives, 70 J.
AM. PLAN. ASSOC. 27, 34–35 (2004) (stating that nine in ten businesses given incentives would
have made the same location decision without the incentive); see, e.g., Richard Florida, Handing
Out Tax Breaks to Business Is Worse Than Useless, CITYLAB (Mar. 7, 2017),
https://www.citylab.com/life/2017/03/business-tax-incentives-waste/518754/ (summarizing studies
that draw negative conclusions about the impact of incentives on local economies).
111. See generally Daniel J. Wilson, Beggar Thy Neighbor? The In-State, Out-of-State, and
Aggregate Effects of R&D Tax Credits, 91 REV. ECON. & STATS. 431 (2009) (noting that tax
subsidies do not achieve a desirable aggregate effect).
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protective Institute for Justice that litigated the Kelo case.112 Most of
the New York City opponents of Amazon’s Long Island City project
wanted to renegotiate, rather than cancel, the City’s $3 billion plan to
attract Amazon.113 Had the company needed to use the condemnation
power to acquire land for its new headquarters, there would almost
certainly have been many more staunch opponents. Moreover, the
apparent paucity of condemnations of residential property—not just
for economic development purposes but for conventional
infrastructure takings as well114—may reflect the relative political
efficacy of condemnees compared to burdened taxpayers.
4. Is the risk of inefficient transfer reduced if the transferee makes
a “public use”?
Professor Ulen’s argument that strict public use doctrine reduces
the risk of inefficient transfer115 does not make much sense in its own
terms. More importantly, the argument does not map onto Justice
Thomas’s particular public use test (or, for that matter, any other
administrable public use test). His argument is straightforward: If the
government is constrained in its exercise of the takings power only by
the requirement that it pay fair market value compensation, the
transfer from initial owner to the state may be inefficient (moving the
property from a higher to a lower valued use) because the initial owner
values the property more than fair market value, and fair market value
is all that the government has demonstrated a willingness to pay.116
Moreover, the vulnerability of private property to expropriation at a
112. Some of the distinction doubtless comes from discrepancies in the simplicity of the cases.
In Poletown it was easy to understand the eminent domain process well enough to understand
who benefitted and who lost. Issues involving tax and regulatory subsidies are more complex. The
subsidies offered Amazon by New York City were insanely complex. It is not the case that New
York City planned to just cut the company a $3 billion check it could use to defray expenses, the
city offered a variety of zoning concessions, designations of the headquarters as eligible to receive
favorable federal tax Enterprise Zone treatment, eligibility for a tax abatement program
dependent on new job creation. For a fuller description of the complex array of sweeteners that
Amazon was apparently offered, see Emily Holloway, What Comes Next? Building on the
Momentum of the Amazon Fiasco, ADVOCATE (Apr. 7, 2019), https://gcadvocate.com/2019/04/07/
what-comes-next-building-on-the-momentum-of-the-amazon-fiasco/.
113. Id. (urging for New York City to ask Amazon for more favorable terms in exchange for
the subsidies rather than give no subsidies at all).
114. See MIHALY, supra note 23, at 10–12 (stating that condemnations for redevelopment
purposes are rare). But see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., Eminent Domain: Information
about Its Uses and Effect on Property Owner and Communities Is Limited (Nov. 2006)
(summarizing issues with the data used in studies of eminent domain that preclude us from
understanding much about actual eminent domain practices).
115. See Ulen, supra note 85, at 167.
116. Id. at 167–68.
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price lower than the owner’s reservation price may cause secondary
inefficiencies. Owners may waste resources lobbying the government
to forego taking their property. They also might under-invest in
developing sentimental attachments to their property or make fewer
non-transferable investments that buyers would not value.117 But there
would be efficiency losses if we forego the condemnation power
completely. We need the eminent domain power to permit the
provision of large-scale, complex public goods—goods that require the
simultaneous purchase by the buyer of many parcels for the purpose of
providing a public good.118
Proponents of this argument focus on the same sort of meansoriented public use test long associated with Professor Merrill. Instead
of focusing on how the seized property is used, we should inquire
whether it is necessary for the government to use eminent domain as a
means to overcome holdout problems.119 Professor Ulen argues that the
ends and means are inextricably linked. He asserts that the only
situation in which there is an efficiency reason to overcome holdout
problems is one in which the government needs to assemble a parcel to
provide a “large, complex public good,” because these public goods
projects alone are the sort that the government provides more
efficiently than private market actors do.120 Absent the sort of market
failure we observe only in the provision of public goods, “the most
efficient method for determining relative valuation of . . . property is
voluntary exchange.”121

117. Id. at 170.
118. Id. at 171–72.
119. See Merrill, supra note 51.
120. Ulen, supra note 85, at 174–76.
121. Id. at 187–88. There is another, if less significant, puzzling and troubling feature of Ulen’s
argument: market failures may preclude the efficient transfer of property to a private user whose
use has no public goods aspects at all. Consider, for instance, the problem of strategic behavior
leading to a bargaining breakdown when there are bilateral monopolies (and hold-outs always
create a localized bilateral monopoly problem). In many circumstances, property would not be
efficiently transferred absent government edict even when there is no public aspect to the forced
transfer at all. Relative hardship doctrine in trespass law (limiting the plaintiff to damages rather
than injunction) implicitly forces a sale in a bilateral monopoly situation to prevent some mix of
unjust distributive outcomes (the victim might get “too much” if he could charge the trespasser
the high cost of removing a trivially invasive structure that damaged him little) and inefficiency
(if in an effort to extract more of the surplus that inheres in continuing the trespass, the rights
holder refused to sell the right to continue the trivial trespass. For an overview of relative hardship
doctrine, see Restatement of Property §563 (1944). See Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI.
L. REV. 517, 529–39, 542–73 (2009) (discussing the merits and ubiquity of permitting private use
condemnations to overcome market failures).

KELMAN_03_15_21 (DO NOT DELETE)

164

3/17/2021 6:48 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 16

The claim that private purchasers will offer bids for property that
equal the total social demand for the condemned land unless the land
is to be used for a “large, complex public good” is wholly unwarranted.
It is true that if the condemned land will be used to provide the most
traditional forms of public goods (a non-rivalrous good from which
exclusion is not possible), it is likely that neither a private party hoping
to sell the good at a profit nor a coalition of potential users would bid
as much for the land as it is actually worth to them because many
“potential buyers” of the public good will be free riders, hoping that
others would purchase the goods or services (whose benefits they
would enjoy whether they paid for the good or not). Essentially, free
riding is what causes public goods to be under-provided in private
markets.122 But while free riding, and concomitant under-valuation by
potential private bidders, is an obvious problem when the land would
be used for a conventional public good, it is also a problem whenever
the land will be used in a fashion that generates positive externalities,
diffuse benefits not fully capturable by those who own the land.123
To clarify the point, take a case that does not directly involve
condemnations or land use at all. Assume that more privileged citizens
are made worse off by the presence of poverty in their community, and
that they place a value on its elimination. Certain privileged citizens
may not contribute funds to alleviate poverty, recognizing that they
cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits of poverty reduction
that would be produced by the contributions of others. But every public

122. We could also take a more political theoretical, rather than economistic, view of “public
goods”—focused less on the failure of markets to capture existing private demand for an endstate and more on the idea that certain goods or end-states are the ones that collective decisionmakers, acting not merely to reflect the self-interest of constituents but trying to ascertain the
community’s higher order commitments, should pursue. In this view, for instance, redistribution
is a “public good” not so much because individual constituents will not “pay for it,” unless others
are forced to pay for it as well (the free rider account), as because a certain level of social equality
is what the community comes to aspire to as the outcome of a certain form of collective moral
discourse. Similarly, one could argue that a legislature seeks species preservation because it is a
public good in an economist’s sense or because it is a public commitment regardless of the present
self-interested tastes that inhabitants of the community now manifest for the preservation.
123. Here is the standard illustration of such externalities. It derives from James Meade,
External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation, 62 ECON. J. 54 (1952). Assume
X is a beekeeper who wants to use Parcel P for his honey-producing business and Y wants to use
it to grow crops that require the use of a toxic pesticide. Y will bid too much for the land unless
he has to account for the negative externality he imposes on his neighbors by using the pesticide,
but X will bid too little because he can only readily capture the income he gets from selling honey,
not the benefits (the positive externality) that he provides nearby farmers by keeping bees that
help pollinate their plants. It may well be factually inaccurate that beekeepers cannot readily
charge farmers for “pollination services” but the conceptual point remains trenchant.
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use in the broad “public purpose” sense shares that very same free rider
problem: Many (if not all) of the people of Detroit would have
benefitted from the spillover effects of economic development of the
Poletown neighborhood, whether they personally paid for it or not.
Though Detroit residents may be physically excluded from the GM
plant (to track Justice Thomas’s version of Ulen’s public goods test),
they cannot be excluded from reaping some of the concomitant
benefits of development. Those benefits would accrue to Detroit
residents whether or not they buy the goods or services that the
putative private buyer (GM) produces using the land as an input.124
Most of the traditional public goods of the sort Thomas protects
(e.g., roads and canals, much less schools or parks) are not truly public
goods. These goods are under-provided in markets not because a
private entrepreneur could not physically exclude non-users and
charge direct users (tolls for those who actually use roads and canals,
tuition for students, entrance fees at parks). Instead, they would be
under-provided predominantly because there are diffuse public
benefits associated with the production of the goods: economic
development spillovers in the case of canals and roads; the benefits to
third parties that the student does not fully capture when she is
educated; the option value, existence value and eco-system
preservation benefits of maintaining natural land. It is the presence of
these diffuse public benefits that rightly leads us to recognize that,
because of free rider problems, relying solely on private provision and
private bid valuation will cause the supply of these goods to be
inefficiently low.125 Neither Thomas’s public use test nor some other
requirement that the government take property only when it is doing
so to create a traditional public good would permit many takings that
combat free-rider inefficiencies.126
124. Those who would benefit indirectly from the preservation of the neighborhood also
would not manifest these preferences in a market; free rider problems would beset efforts to
aggregate bids either for GM’s use or the initial inhabitants’ ongoing use were we to use markets
(or auctions) to allocate the land so that it was put to its highest valued use.
125. See generally Miceli, supra note 85 (emphasizing that the economically relevant feature
of public goods, in thinking about the propriety of a taking, is simply that there are free rider
problems that lead private bidders to offer too little to produce the good). Consistent with the
analysis in this piece, Miceli also clearly recognizes that free rider problems create the need for
collective provision whether we are considering budgeted spending or the use of condemned
property. Id. at 106, 112–13.
126. Furthermore, Justice Thomas’s test not only forbids takings in which private demand for
a good understates the true efficiency gains from transfer but permits transfers which may well be
inefficient because the condemnee could not actually be fully compensated by those who value
the condemnee’s property. It is absolutely plausible in any given case that property condemned
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5. Does “public use” provide the sort of strong justification we
need to make the imposition of burdens on the condemnee morally
acceptable?
There are three dubious premises that undergird the conclusion
that we need a strong public use requirement to police the disposition
of condemned real property, but not the use of funds garnered though
taxation in order to ensure that those who face the most serious losses
have been subject to a burden that is justifiable to ask them to bear.
The argument’s first problematic premise is that those from whom
property is taken bear losses that are both especially momentous and
atypical, as compared to the losses borne by taxpayers. The second
predicate assumption is that those who are singled out to bear large
losses should be asked to make the atypical momentous sacrifice they
have made only if there is a very good reason for them to do so, while
those who bear smaller or more typical losses should be satisfied if
there is merely a marginal justification for the loss. The third and most
troubling premise assumes that the fact that the property will be put to
“public use” is an especially strong justification for forcing an
individual to bear the loss. These arguments are not commonplace, but
they have been made by some academic commentators127 and more
implicitly by others,128 including judges.129
First, the idea that those from whom property is taken suffer
enormous losses compared to the losses borne by taxpayers is, at best,
true only in certain factual circumstances. In the many cases in which
property owners are adequately compensated, whether because the
owner values the property at its fair market value or because the state
deliberately compensates property owners at levels sufficiently greater
than market value,130 it is taxpayers, not those who face condemnation,
who face the largest loss. Taxpayers simply fork over the money they
owe (and, except in the case of benefits taxes or user fees) receive
whatever government services they value whether or not they pay
taxes—paying taxes is thus a pure loss. Condemnees, on the other hand,
lose nothing if fully indemnified. And even in condemnation cases
for ownership or direct use by the public is valued more highly by the condemnee.
127. See Elezar, supra note 86, at 254–56, 265–66.
128. See, e.g., Ulen, supra note 85, at 189.
129. See, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 666 (Mich.
1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
130. It is worth noting once more that 92 percent of homeowners sixty or older surveyed after
the Poletown taking thought they had received fair compensation. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF.., supra note 33, at 23.
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where there is some uncompensated increment, it is unclear that the
uncompensated increment is more burdensome than taxes. If we
assume that jurisdictions that give a 25 percent premium for homes
estimate the uncompensated increment accurately and that the median
price of an American home is $330,000,131 folks who get compensated
at fair market value typically lose a bit more than $80,000 once in their
lives; on the other hand, an average earner pays more than double that
in federal income taxes alone over the course of their life.132
It might still be argued that condemnations are more troubling
because undercompensated property owners suffer a unique loss that
those not subject to eminent domain do not, while taxpayers suffer
widely shared losses. It is not obvious that we need to justify asking
someone to make a relatively unique sacrifice of a particular size more
than we need to justify more widespread sacrifices of equal size, but for
the moment, a narrower point is more relevant. It may be difficult to
identify people who pay a disproportionate amount in taxes, and we
have even less capacity to identify those who benefit little from public
spending despite paying similar taxes.133 But that does not mean that
there are no people whose taxpaying burdens are not just atypically
high, but atypically high in quite significant ways.
Moreover, the argument that we can impose burdens with “weak”
justification on a taxpayer, assuming we conclude that many around the
taxpayer have been asked to make the same sacrifice, is
administratively confusing and conceptually unsatisfying. At the
administrative level, it is unclear how widespread a loss must be for us
131. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, supra note 102.
132. See Richard Barrington, How Much Will You Pay in Taxes Over Your Lifetime?,
FORBES (Mar. 17, 2011), https://www.forbes.com/sites/moneybuilder/2011/03/17/how-much-doyou-pay-in-taxes-over-your-lifetime/#4d35baaa/ (stating that the average earner pays an
estimated $188,520 in federal taxes over her lifetime).
133. Sometimes identifying people who pay too much or receive too little relative to others
who pay the same amount is not that tricky. For instance, people who realize capital gains pay
taxes that those who devise or bequeath appreciated assets at death never do even though those
who realize gains before death are either identically or more poorly situated (cash poor) than
those who pass the appreciated assets to devisees and legatees. (We may be talking millions of
dollars in “excess” taxes for those who realize gains). And childless people who pay school taxes
may indeed share the diffuse public benefits of universal education, but they do not enjoy the
(derivative) private benefits that parents get when, for example, their children’s earning capacity
is increased by schooling. Looking at property taxes in the very high tax suburb of New York that
I grew up in, someone owning a home whose market value is around $1 million would pay annual
school taxes of approximately $6,600 per year. If we assume a childless couple is paying school
taxes for somewhere in the vicinity of the 15 years that a two-child couple is receiving private
benefits from the schools, then the childless couple is paying nearly $100,000 more in (net) taxes
than the couple with children.
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to ignore it: Are we to ignore the Poletown residents’ complaints
because thousands were displaced, rather than a single homeowner (or
three or five or fifty)?
At the conceptual level, the argument that we require greater
justification to injure a few than to injure many entails a rejection of
methodological individualism—an approach that Justice Thomas
would likely find troubling. Certainly, those who emphasize the
separateness of persons that justifies individual rights frameworks do
not think that an individual whose rights are infringed should be
reassured to learn that others have borne the same injury; libertarians
would never be reassured to learn that they are merely one of many
whose rights were trampled. For a methodological individualist, each
displaced resident of Poletown and each taxpayer whose money went
to fund a troublingly private development project deserves the same
sort of explanation. The fact that there are more similarly situated
parties in one scenario than the other is entirely beside the point.
Counter to the arguments just presented, one might still conclude
that those subjected to eminent domain experience losses that are both
larger and less widely shared than the losses faced by taxpayers
spending large sums to fund projects that do not selfishly benefit them.
One could further reject these arguments and believe that those facing
large or atypical losses should face them only when there are especially
strong justifications for facing them. Even then, the conclusion that we
need the public use requirement to guarantee that those bearing
atypical and large losses do so only when the losses are “justified” is
extraordinarily weak. There is nearly no relationship between any
“public use” requirement (especially Justice Thomas’s) and “strong
justification.”
For individualists, it is tautologically true that the gains that
counterbalance the losses that the taxpayer or condemnee experiences
must be enjoyed by individuals because only individuals have interests
or can experience gains. We are justified to impose suffering to create
Thomas’s sort of public use goods only because individuals are
benefitted by the creation of these goods; for individualists, what else
could the justification be? But even for those who believe we can
distinguish public gains from aggregated private gains, there will surely
be “private gains” to others that justify losses and suffering as much as
these putative “public gains.”
Assume, arguendo, that the Poletown homeowners made an
atypically large sacrifice and that this is unfair unless they have been
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given an especially powerful reason to do so. The idea that their
sacrifice would be more justified if it had gone to build a park or a
highway, rather than to serve “private” ends (like keeping on some
autoworkers in the Poletown plant who would otherwise have to leave
the Detroit area or change vocations), is unfathomable. Likewise, a
taxpayer who bore disproportionate burdens need not be reassured to
learn that his tax dollars funded a traditional public good whose
provision he opposed (“defense” spending, or highways that facilitated
white flight to the suburbs) rather than redistributive efforts he favored
that would target particular private parties (like health care for
otherwise uncovered sick children, or public education that equalizes
opportunity). “Public uses” may not serve the interests of those who
sacrificed to facilitate them; “private” uses may. There is no systematic
reason to believe that our material sacrifices will feel more justified
when they fund one type of legislatively directed project than another.
CONCLUSION
Of course, it can be a bad thing that public programs may serve
parochial interests, though what is really a bad thing is that they may
serve the wrong parochial interests. The word “wrong” is important to
emphasize, though. It is by no means a bad thing, for instance, that
certain programs (e.g., Medicaid) primarily serve the immediate
interests of materially disadvantaged members of the community, even
if we think programs that serve these groups could be thought of as
parochial in some ways.
Wrong-headed parochial projects may entail taxing and expending
money or they may entail different forms of garnering resources
(“taxing” via condemnation, particularly when there is an
“uncompensated increment” such that condemnees are undercompensated; “taxing” via regulation that impels regulated parties to
expend resources to meet collectively established aims) and distinct
forms of spending (using the resources gained through condemnation
on the program the government directs them to be used in; funneling
resources to a regulatory program’s beneficiaries).
Alas, there is nothing much for courts to do about unwarranted
parochialism in the straightforward tax-and-spend cases, and the things
that Thomas proposes to do about it in the condemn-and-use cases are
senseless. There is nothing much to do about parochialism for a host of
conceptual and practical reasons. Conceptually, the distinction between
parochial projects designed to aid individuals and those with a public
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purpose is completely obtuse from the vantage of methodological
individualists, those who believe that only individuals truly have
interests. For methodological individualists, gains to “the public” are
just the sum of gains to individuals. And asking courts to determine
when too few people benefit from a public project – much less the
wrong few – is hopeless. There are plainly conventional public works
projects whose benefits are narrowly focused. The extreme case is the
public airport serving only private airplane owners, but parks and
highways are often moderate cases. At the same time, there are some
projects that directly benefit a narrow constituency that may seem
unproblematic in part because there is widespread collective support
for granting those benefits and in part because the benefits of the endstate would be under-provided in a private market. In this regard,
consider again typical redistributive programs that directly benefit only
the “needy” sub-set of the population. But when are any of these
projects on the wrong side of the “unacceptably parochial” line?
Supporters of a narrow view of the public use requirement have
offered no persuasive functional reasons to believe that it is more
sensible for courts to try to remedy the problems of unwarranted
parochialism when resources are garnered through eminent domain
rather than taxation. Tax-and-spend programs to attract Amazon,
whether in the form of property tax abatements or highly targeted,
company-specific infrastructure development, were just as
substantively parochial as programs that would have assembled parcels
for the company. But because such facially “parochial” programs might
well benefit less parochial economic development interests over time,
courts wisely refuse to invalidate them. And supporters of the narrow
view of public use have given no reason whatsoever—functional or
textual or formalist—to believe that courts should scrutinize the use of
resources subject to takings law protection that are gathered by
condemnation of real property more than they should scrutinize the
use of resources subject to regulatory takings law protection. Nor have
they provided a policy-based rationale for why property takings should
be scrutinized more closely than tax-and-spend programs.
Justice Thomas is right that it might be possible to come up with a
judicially enforceable test for undue parochialism in the context of
eminent domain even if doing so for spending programs would be more
difficult. He proposes that the garnered resources must be owned by
the state or a common carrier and open to use by the general public.
But the test is considerably less administrable that its proponents
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would have us believe. Set aside for a moment the glaring problem that
it is hard to apply to most regulatory takings, leaving us with two
distinct and inconsistent tests to determine when a taking is simply
impermissible rather than merely giving rise to a compensation
requirement. What is more is that it is impossible to determine what
“public ownership” means when private users may be bound by explicit
state-based directions to use property in a particular way. This problem
only intensifies as governments move to privatize service delivery and
to enter into public-private joint ventures. It is equally impossible to
determine when property is truly open to the public in relevant ways.
Realistically, some members of the public will have little or no interest
in accessing “public” property or may not have the capacity to access
it—particularly when public facilities are not free.
But what is far more bothersome than the test’s blurriness is that it
is conceptually senseless. Justice Thomas’s form of “public use” is a
very poor proxy for uses that are acceptably non-parochial. The test
plainly permits programs that actually serve narrow interests. In fact,
because a decent case can be made that all public programs serve some
sub-set of the population’s needs better than they do others’, the failure
of the test to shut down government entirely is puzzling. Furthermore,
the test also forbids uses where eminent domain seems appropriate
under any sensible functional approach. The government may sensibly
undertake projects when private demand in the market is suppressed
by free rider problems (whether public provision is appropriate
because the project is designed to produce conventional public goods
like defense or merely to produce goods generating substantial positive
externalities, as is the case in the economic development sphere). And
it makes use of the condemnation power as a means to realize these
projects, rather than market purchase, because it faces hold-out
problems in assembling parcels (whether for public roads, large military
bases or large factories).
Many, but by no means all, of the economic development takings of
the sort that excited such rage after Kelo were indeed likely parochial
in the bad sense. The same is true of similar tax abatement and
infrastructure development deals, untouched by the narrow public use
test for condemnations alone. But much of the fuss we saw, historically,
over the poster child private use condemnations in Kelo and Poletown
was ideological in the pejorative sense. Most of the bad outcomes of
eminent domain (under-compensation of a non-trivial proportion of
parcel owners who lose property, particularly residential property, and
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destruction of communities) occur regardless of how condemned land
is used. The construction of the constitutionally unproblematic highway
system not only caused the same sorts of damage to property owners
that the Kelo hysterics decry, but the gains and losses from these
ostensibly public programs were hardly uniform.134 And the
overwrought solicitude for the displaced would feel a bit more moving
and sincere if those, like Justice Thomas, who wept over the use of
condemnation, paid any heed to the far more massive dislocations that
routinely occur because of market forces. The GM-UAW-Detroit troika
may have directly displaced 4,000 residents of Poletown,135 but the
ongoing mix of market forces and imperfect governance caused far
more serious depopulation in the previous decade.
At its core, the Kelo dissent is devoid of reason. It is unsound
constitutional law. But more importantly, it is singularly unhelpful in
guiding the policy decisions that state legislatures must make today
about the permissibility of condemnations. A more solid foundation is
needed to guide narrow issues that arise in the context of eminent
domain or the broader questions that arise when we rightly worry
about the unjust distribution of public benefits.
The problem of unduly parochial government programs will not be
remedied by endowing courts with greater power to strike down
legislatively authorized uses of either the funds raised through taxation
or the land acquired through condemnation. It is by no means obvious
that we can adequately constrain inappropriate parochialism through
the range of mechanisms designed to counter asymmetric influence in
the political process– campaign finance reform, increasing transparency
of legislative action, restraining lobbyists and making their efforts more
public, vigorously prosecuting those who offer and those who receive
more explicit bribes to influence public decision making. But we should
be looking to reform of the political process rather than judicial
enforcement of constitutional or statutory bans on inadequately public
programs to ameliorate, if not completely fix, the problem that too
many programs benefit a small sub-set of the populace. Conceptually
and functionally, Justice Thomas’s public use test is unilluminating. Its

134. Spoiler alert: Facilitating white flight suburbanization through the construction of the
interstate highway system was hardly an unambiguously non-parochial public project!
135. It would also be helpful to recall that the condemnation probably should not be seen as
“displacing” most of them but rather as having given many of the supposedly “displaced” the
financial wherewithal to exit a broken community that they wanted to get out of.
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infirmities demand that state legislatures abandon such a rigid and
ineffective standard.

